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1. Matthew 6:24 (Revised Standard Version). This phrase was cited by the
Supreme Court in reference to a conflict of interests that involved a government
official. United States v. Miss. Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 549 (1961).
The obvious purpose of the statute is to insure honesty in the Government's
business dealings by preventing federal agents who have interests adverse to
those of the Government from advancing their own interests at the expense
of the public welfare. The moral principle upon which the statute is based
has its foundation in the Biblical admonition that no man may serve two
masters, Matt. 6:24, a maxim which is especially pertinent if one of the
masters happens to be economic self-interest. Consonant with this salutary
moral purpose, Congress has drafted a statute which speaks in very
comprehensive terms. Section 434 is not limited in its application to those in
the highest echelons of government service, or to those government agents
who have only a direct financial interest in the business entities with which
they negotiate on behalf of the Government, or to a narrow class of business
transactions. Nor is the statute's scope restricted by numerous provisos and
exceptions, as is true of many penal statutes. Rather, it applies, without
exception, to 'whoever' is 'directly or indirectly interested in the pecuniary
profits or contracts' of a business entity with which he transacts any business
'as an officer or agent of the United States.'
Id. at 549-50. The above quote refers to 18 U.S.C. § 434 which has been repealed and
replaced with 18 U.S.C. § 208 encompassing equally comprehensive terms. 18 U.S.C.
§ 208 (2000).
f The Author would like to thank his wife Jami for her immense patience and
support over these many years. The Author would also like to thank his mentor, Scott
Kurth, Attorney at Law, who recommended he attend law school. The Author has
watched Scott endeavor to live each day by his deep moral convictions and by doing
so has been an outstanding leader to his community. Finally, the Author would like to
thank his son Valen (a.k.a. "Dax"), whose gentle heart and perseverance against the
limitations, caused by his autism, have been an inspiration for the Author and bring
hope for all the affected children.

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

1

Texas Wesleyan
Review, Vol. 12
[2022],
Iss. 2, Art. 7
REVIEW
LAW
TEXAS Law
WESLEYAN

IV.

[Vol. 12

3. The Intelligible Principle Requirement .........

606

4. Broad General Directives .......................
C. Nondelegatable Legislation ..........................
1. Traditional Nondelegation ......................
2. Boundless verses Broad Delegations ............
3. Delegations to Private Parties ..................

607
609
610
610
613
617
620
624
628

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES...

V. A FLAWED SYSTEM .....................................
VI. A PROPOSED SOLUTION ................................
V II. CONCLUSION ............................................
I.

INTRODUCTION

Increasingly, employees of the constituent agencies of the United
States Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) are also
paid consultants for the pharmaceutical industry. The DHHS is the
Cabinet-level department of the Federal executive branch that is the
most concerned with our nation's public health issues.3 The DHHS is
composed of eleven individual health agencies, including such wellknown agencies as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and the National
Institutes of Health (NIH).4 Recently, hundreds of private consulting
arrangements were revealed between pharmaceutical companies and
DHHS employees. 5 The existence and effect of these relationships
between private industry and public employees call into question the
independence and trustworthiness of these federal health agencies
and undermine the administrative agencies' effectiveness in protecting
the public health.6 In essence, the DHHS has been infected, not by a
virus, but by a disease known as greed. In addition to the public
2. David Willman, Stealth Merger: Drug Companies and Government Medical Research L.A. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2003, at Al [hereinafter Stealth Merger].
3. OFFICE OF THE FED. REGISTER, NAT'L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL 2005/2006, at 217-27 (rev. 2005) [hereinafter

U.S.

GOV'T MANUAL].

4. Id. The FDA is charged with ensuring our food is pure, safe, and wholesome;
our medications are safe and effective; and our products emitting radiation are safe.
Id. The CDC is charged with protecting the public health of the nation by providing
leadership and direction in the prevention of and control of diseases and other preventable conditions. Id. The NIH supports biomedical and behavioral research domestically and abroad, conducts research in its laboratories and clinics, trains
promising young researchers and promotes acquisition and distribution of medical
knowledge. Id. The other eight agencies within the DHHS organization are responsible for a variety of public health areas from child issues, to the health concerns of the
elderly, to the control of toxic substances, and etc. Id.
5. NIH Ethics Concerns: Consulting Arrangements and Outside Awards: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. On Energy
and Commerce, 108th Cong. 488 (2004) microformed on CIS No. 2004-H361-48
(Cong. Info. Serv.) [hereinafter NIH Ethics Hearings].
6. See Stealth Merger, supra note 2, at Al (quoting Dr. Arnold S. Relman and
others in the field).
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health issue, there may be a Constitutional issue involved as well that
may point to a potential solution.
When private industry relationships affect the decisions of a public
agency, it creates concerns regarding the constitutional standing of the
government agency in its function as a rule making body. 7 The unconstitutional delegation of Congressional legislative power, known as the
non-delegation doctrine, can be classed in two forms: (1) those that
lack any appreciable standard, and (2) those that allow the promulgation of rules after the involvement of private groups in the legislative
process.8 The "permissive culture" of financial conflicts of interest between employees of the DHHS and biomedical firms, combined with
the net effect of approving bad drugs, and the source of funds for drug
regulation appears to create substantial private influence and involvement of private interests within the agency.' This Comment submits
that extensive conflicts of interests can effectively privatize a public
agency, and thereby violating the nondelegation doctrine and undermining the constitutionality of an executive branch agency.
The issue of privatization reveals an endemic problem of constitutionality of all federal government agencies under their current formulation that needs to be addressed by the Legislature, Executive, and
Judiciary. 10 The current structure of the federal government agencies
inherently conflicts with the separation of powers doctrine by providing within one organization or branch of the government all three legislative, executive, and judicial powers."1 This issue underlies the
development of the conflict of interests and allows undue private in7. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936) ("This is legislative
delegation in its most obnoxious form; for it is not even delegation to an official or an
official body, presumptively disinterested, but to private persons ....
"); A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 95 U.S. 495, 537 (1935) ("Could trade or
industrial associations or groups be constituted legislative bodies for that purpose because such associations or groups are familiar with the problems of their enterprises?
... Such a delegation of legislative power is unknown to our law and is utterly inconsistent with the constitutional prerogatives and duties of Congress.").
8. E. H. Schopler, Annotation, Delegation of Legislative Power to Nongovernmental Agencies as Regards Prices, Wages, and Hours, 3 A.L.R.2d 188 § 3 (1949).
9. See generally David Willman, The Nation, L.A. Times, Aug. 6, 2004, at Al
[hereinafter The Nation] (stating that the NIH is beset with a permissive culture);
NIH Ethics Hearing, supra note 5 (testimony of Dr. Elias A. Zerhouni indicating
there had been about 1,500 agreements involving 500 employees over 5 years); see
also U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMM. ON GOV'T REFORM, 1 06TH CONG.,
MAJORITY STAFF REPORT: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN VACCINE POLICY MAKING

34-35, 37-38 (2000), microformed on CIS No. 2000-H402-4 (Cong. Info. Serv.) [hereinafter MAJORITY STAFF REPORT ON VACCINE POLICY MAKING] (finding that the
policy making advisory committees were infected with undue influence by private interests); United States Senator Charles E. Grassley (R-IA) Holds Hearing on FDA,
Merck and Vioxx: Putting Patient Safety First, Part 1: Hearing Before the S. Finance
Comm., 108th Cong. (2004) (hereinafter Vioxx Hearing].
10. See generally STEPHEN G. BREYER et al., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 37-38 (5th ed. 2002).
11. See Id.
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fluence. Additionally, the executive branch currently exercises the
power that allows or denies conflicts of interest to exist, with self-restraint and self-regulation being the only barriers. 12 The structure of
Executive Branch agencies do not provide the checks and balance
protections that should deter, if not prevent, the development of a
permissive culture within one branch of the government. 13 The long
term solution must include a return to the framers' intent 1 4 by requiring the structure of the government to conform to the separation of
powers structure defined by the Constitution. As long as the Executive Branch exercises all three powers, any change can be reversed
upon its own accord.
This Comment examines the financial conflicts of interests within
the DHHS that results in private influence, the consequential impact
of the private influence on the agency's constitutionality under the
nondelegation and separation of powers doctrines, and offers a solution that better conforms to the principles and structure of the United
States Constitution. Part II examines the penetration of conflicts of
interests within the DHHS and impact on drug safety and human
lives. Part III discusses the separation of powers doctrine and the development of the nondelegation doctrine with respect to delegations
to private groups. Part IV analyzes the constitutionality of administrative agencies under the influence of private interests. Part V analyzes the constitutionality of administrative agencies with respect to
the separation of powers doctrine. Part VI proposes a solution to the
problems of private interests with administrative agencies. This Comment concludes in advocating a long term solution of repairing the
structural flaws that violate the separation of powers by advocating
the reformation of Executive Branch agencies into constituent legislative, executive and adjudicatory functions and altering their reporting
structure to corresponding branches. In practical terms, the agencies
must be disassembled and rebuilt to separate the powers.

II.

BACKGROUND: THE PRICE IN HUMAN LIVES

Private interest has invaded the DHHS. 15 The invasion began more
than twenty years ago and continues to this day.16 When the private
interests affect the safety of drugs, it becomes a life and death issue. 7
A.

The Price of Rezulin

Is one death enough? On May 17, 1998, Audrey LaRue Jones, a
fifty-five-year-old high school teacher, died of sudden liver failure; she
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

See 18 U.S.C. § 208 (2000).
See generally BREYER, supra note 10, at 37-38.
See id.
Stealth Merger, supra note 2, at Al.
Id.
See id.
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had taken a drug called Rezulin as part of an NIH study to treat diabetes."8 There had been early reports of liver failure related deaths
that began to show up in fall of 1997.19 In response, British distributors, in consultation with the British Government's Medicines and
Healthcare Regulatory Agency, voluntarily removed the drug from
the market citing safety concerns. 2° Although the British withdrawal
was announced in December of 1997, it would not be until June 2,
1998, sixteen days after Mrs. Jones died, that officials of the NIH
voted, over the objections of the researchers, to remove the drug from
the diabetes study.2 1 The actions of the researchers involved in the
study raised serious ethical questions regarding financial conflicts of
interest.2 2
During the Rezulin study in which Mrs. Jones died, the manufacturer of the drug provided either research funding or compensation to
at least twelve of the twenty-two scientists operating the nationwide
diabetes study.2 3 In mid-1996 the drug was selected by NIH researchers as one of two drugs for a $150 million nationwide study. 24 The
L.A. Times reported that Dr. Eastman received $78,000 from the manufacturer while overseeing the selection of Rezulin for the NIH study
in which Mrs. Jones had participated.2 5 Another study leader, Dr.
Olefsky, advocated the selection while serving as co-founding chairman of a group established to encourage doctors to prescribe Rezulin.26 The group was financed by the manufacturer. Dr. Olefsky was
also listed on three of the drug's patents. 27 Additionally, as an undisclosed matter, Dr. Olefsky co-founded a privately held firm which accepted a diabetes grant from the manufacturer of Rezulin that could
total in excess of $50 million.28 The death of Audrey Jones and the
18. David Willman, Scientists Who Judged Pill Safety Received Fees, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 29, 1999, at A22 [hereinafter Scientists Received Fees].
19. Id.
20. Posting of Syed Rizwanuddin Ahmad to E-Drug, http://www.essentialdrugs.
org/edrug/archive/199712/msgO009.php (Dec. 5, 1997, 15:38:16 EST) (on file at Texas
Wesleyan Law Review).
21. Scientists Received Fees, supra note 18, at A22.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. The grant took the form of upfront license fees and equity investments as
well as milestone payments for reaching research objectives. What They're Talking
About Around the Water Cooler, DIABETES HEALTH, July 2000, available at
http://www.diabeteshealth.com/read,4000,1939.html (announcing the collaboration of
Warner-Lambert and Metabolix). In exchange, Parke-Davis, the pharmaceutical research division of Warner-Lambert, would receive exclusive worldwide commercialization rights to products resulting from the research. Id. The funding and
compensation represent a conflict of interest for the employees selecting and operating the study.
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withdrawal of Rezulin from the study were warning signs for
a larger
29
problem because the drug was in circulation in the market.
Are 556 deaths enough? There were warning signs that the drug
may have safety issues.3" Using his official capacity, Dr. Eastman advocated the use of Rezulin both within the NIH and to doctors involved in studies despite having signed a federal recusal disqualifying
himself from all official matters involving Rezulin. 31 Even after Britain's Medicines Control Agency concluded Rezulin was unsafe, Dr.
Eastman continued advocating the drug and characterized the British
market withdrawal as a marketing decision.3 2 The decision to withdraw the drug within the United Kingdom was made because of safety
concerns, as indicated by GlaxoWellcome's and Sankyo Pharma's effort to warn doctors and pharmacists about reactions to the medication that included severe hepatocellular damage, hepatic necrosis and
hepatic failure.3 3 The Inspector General, whose mission "is to protect
the integrity of Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
programs, as well as the health and welfare of the beneficiaries of
those programs,"3 4 eventually cleared Dr. Eastman concluding "that
unspecified administrative errors... contributed to the appearance of
a conflict of interests."3 5 Officials at the NIH, not the researchers,
eventually removed the drug from the study.3 6 But it would not be
until the year 2000, that the manufacturer Warner-Lambert finally
withdrew the drug from the market. 7 This delay would prove
critical.3 8
In terms of human life, by the time the drug was withdrawn it was
linked to 556 deaths, including sixty-eight that resulted from liver fail29. Scientists Received Fees, supra note 18, at A22.
30. See Meds. & Health Prods. Control Agency, Troglitazone (Romozin) Withdrawn, 23 CURRENT PROBLEMS IN PHARMACOVIGILANCE 13 (1997), available at http:/
/www.mhra.gov.uk/home/groups/pl-p/documents/publication/con007478.htm.
31. Scientists Received Fees, supra note 18, at A22.
32. Id.; See Meds. & Health Prods. Control Agency, Troglitazone (Romozin) Withdrawn, 23 CURRENT PROBLEMS IN PHARMACOVIGILANCE 13 (1997), available at http:/
/www.mhra.gov.uk/home/groups/pl-p/documents/publication/con007478.htm.
33. Posting of Syed Rizwanuddin Ahmad to E-Drug, http://www.essentialdrugs.
org/edrug/archive/199712/msgOO009.php (Dec. 5, 1997, 15:38:16 EST) (on file at Texas
Wesleyan Law Review).
34. Office of the Inspector General, Dep't of Health & Human Servs., OIG Mission, http://www.oig.hhs.gov/organization/oigmission.html (last visited January 25,
2006). The mission statement as it appears in the Federal Registry states that the
"OIG was established by law as an independent and objective oversight unit of the
Department to carry out the mission of protecting economy, efficiency and effectiveness through the elimination of waste, abuse and fraud." Dep't of Health and Human
Services, 69 Fed. Reg. 40,386 (July 2, 2004).
35. Stealth Merger, supra note 2, at Al (ellipsis in original) (internal quotations
omitted).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Scientists Received Fees, supra note 18, at A22.
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ure. But lives would not be the only critical measure.3 9 By October of
1999, drug sales would exceed 1.6 billion dollars ($1,600,000,000).40
Not unexpectedly, with drug sales of $137 million in just three months
of 1997," 1 the resulting delay involved hundreds of millions, if not billions, of dollars in pharmaceutical sales. In the case of Rezulin, there
were warning signs, financial conflicts of interests, enormous sales
figures, and ultimately action that occurred too late to save lives. This
tragic theme would play over and over again.42
B.

The Price of Vioxx and Other COX-2 Inhibitor Drugs

Are 55,000 deaths enough? On November 18, 2004, the Senate Finance Committee heard testimony from Dr. David Graham, an Associate Director of Science at the FDA, regarding the safety of the drug
Vioxx.43 Vioxx is a nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drug (NSAID), of
the COX-2 inhibitor class, which relieves pain and inflammation, and
typically used to treat arthritis, acute pain, acute migraine attacks, and
menstrual pain." Dr. Graham released a widely publicized review of
insurance data that found that Vioxx may have been associated with
more than 27,000 heart attacks and strokes.45 During testimony
before the Senate Finance Committee, Dr. Graham estimated that between 88,000 and 139,000 American lives were permanently affected
by Vioxx, and also estimated 30% to 40% (26,400 to 55,600) of these
patients probably died.4 6 Like Rezulin, there were early warnings of
problems with the drug.4 7
Internal Merck documents indicated that the company was aware of
the problems with Vioxx as early as 1997.48 Dr. Graham testified that
Merck knew of warning signs as of April 1998, prior to the drugs approval in May of 1999.4 9 One external committee that monitored Vioxx's safety during clinical trials "had early data suggesting the users
could be at increased risk of certain heart problems after as little as
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. The Diabetes Monitor, Troglitazone (Rezulin), http://www.diabetesmonitor.
com/rezulin.htm (last visited January 25, 2006).
42. See id.
43. Vioxx Hearing, supra note 9.
44. Id.; U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Vioxx (rofecoxib) Questions and Answers,
http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/vioxx/vioxxqa.htm.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Press Release, Am. Trial Lawyers Assoc., Facts Merck Can't Make Disappear,
Even With the New Jersey Verdict (Nov. 3 2005), http://www.atla.org/pressroom/vioxx/evidence-newj ersey.aspx.
48. Id.
49. Vioxx Hearings, supra note 9.
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four months."5 Once again, the familiar issue of conflicts of interest
was involved within the process.51
The FDA assembled a five person safety advisory committee to
monitor Vioxx's safety during clinical trials in 2000.52 The five person
committee included one Merck employee and two scientists that had
consulted for Merck.5 3 One of the scientists had already authored a
paper defending Vioxx's safety by attacking a study that raised concerns about Vioxx. 54 Despite these early warnings, the company did
not withdraw the drug until September 30, 2004, after Dr. Graham
submitted his findings to the FDA.55
Other drugs of the same COX-2 class have also had early safety
problems and the conflicts of interest problem pervades the studies of
these drugs as well.5 6 On December 17, 2004, the NIH announced the
suspension of clinical trials involving Celebrex, a drug similar to Vioxx, due to safety issues.5 7 The New York Times reports that Pfizer
"acknowledged that a 1999 clinical trial found that elderly patients
taking the drug were far more likely to suffer heart problems than
patients taking a placebo., 58 As a result, these drugs have either been
withdrawn from the market or have new safety warnings.59
Despite the withdrawal, Merck and Pfizer recently argued to reinstate Vioxx, Celebrex, and Bextra, but the review committee once
again was composed of voting members with conflicts of interest.60
The committee voted to keep all three of the drugs on the market. 6 '
Of the thirty-two person committee, ten voting members that had direct conflicts of interests with one of the three manufacturers and sev50. Barbara Martinez, Merck Documents Shed Light on Vioxx Legal Battles:
Records Show Safety Panel Had Early Data Indicating Higher Heart-ProblemsRisk,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2005 at Al.
51. See id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Vioxx Hearing, supra note 9; Cal. HealthCare Found., FDA Officials Delayed,
Discounted Study on Safety Risks of Vioxx, Agency Researcher Says, CAL.
HEALTHLINE, Nov. 4, 2004, http://ww.californiahealthline.org/index.cfm?Action=
dspltem&itemlD=107385&ClassCD=CL116.
56. See Alex Berenson & Gardiner Harris, Pfizer Says 1999 Trials Revealed Risks
With Celebrex, N.Y. TIMEsFeb. 1, 2005, at Cl.
57. Pres Release, Health Scis. Auth., Updated HAS Advisory for Healthcare Professionals: Celecoxib (Celebrex®) and Related Drugs (Dec. 27, 2004), http://
www.hsa.gov.sg/docs/safetyalert-celecoxib 27Dec04.pdf.
58. Berenson & Harris, supra note 56, at Cl.
59. Press Release, Food & Drug Admin., FDA Alert for Practitioners Celecoxib
(marketed as Celebrex), (April 7, 2005), http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/
celebrexlcelebrex-hcp.htm; Press Release, Food & Drug Admin., FDA Alert for
Healthcare Professionals, Valdecoxib (marketed as Bextra), (April 7, 2005), http://
www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infosheets/hcp/valdecoxibhcp.pdf.
60. Press Release, Ctr. For Sci. in the Pub. Interest, Conflicts of Interest on COX2 Panel, (Feb. 25, 2005), http://www.cspinet.org/integrity/press/200502251.html.
61. Id.
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enteen voting members that had more distant connections (of which
three were considered so distant as to be non-conflicting). 62 The vote
passed by a narrow margin in some matters and a wide margin in
others, but if the conflicted members were not allowed to vote, the
results would be very different-it would have voted against the reintroduction of Vioxx and Bextra.6 3 When Dr. Graham testified that
the FDA, as currently configured, is incapable of protecting America
against another Vioxx, he indicated that "we are virtually defenseless. ' ' 64 It took less than six months to prove him right, but even his
reality that America could not be prostatements barely covered the
65
tected from the same Vioxx.
The problem of conflicts of interest within the area of medicine development and safety reach far beyond problem drugs.6 6 A well-publicized example is the case of Dr. Trey Sunderland who received
$508,050 in fees and related income from Pfizer, Inc. while collaborating with Pfizer in studies as part of his governmental function.6 7 His
actions included endorsing the use of an Alzhiemer's drug made by
Pfizer during a nationally televised presentation at the NIH in 2003
without ever disclosing his financial affiliation.68 Over the last two
years, it became public knowledge that the financial conflicts of interest within the DHHS had become a pervasive problem.69
C.

Conflicts of Interest within the NIH

Traditionally, federal government agencies were not closely involved with private industry. 70 In fact, the involvement of private industry in the creation of rule making authority of government
agencies has been one of the great taboos since the beginning of the
administrative age of the 1930s. 7' Even as recently as twenty years
ago, the NIH was so distinct from industry that Margaret Heckler,
Secretary of Health and Human Services, called it "an island of objective and pristine research, untainted by influences of commercializathat has all changed as the story of the NIH clearly
tion."'72 But, 73
demonstrates !
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Vioxx Hearing, supra note 9.
65. Id.; see Press Release, Ctr. For Sci. in the Pub. Interest, supra note 60.
66. See The Nation, supra note 9, at Al.
67. David Willman, The Nat'l Inst. of Health: Public Servant or PrivateMarkerter?,
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2004, at Al [hereinafter Public Servant].
68. Id.
69. See generally The Nation, supra note 9, at Al.
70. See Stealth Merger, supra note 2, at Al.
71. See generally Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S.
388, 405-33 (1935).
72. Stealth Merger, supra note 2, at Al.
73. See id.
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As early as 1980, consulting arrangements began to grow within the
agencies.7 4 By 1995, then NIH director Harold E. Varmus removed
the ban of consulting fee arrangements by a non-published internal
memo to bring NIH standards more in line with new, less stringent
Executive Branch standards.7 5 Not only was the memo kept secret, so
was much of the consulting income and, by 1998, officials of the NIH
allowed "94% of the agency's top-paid employees to keep their consulting incomes confidential."7 6 Top NIH scientists are among the
highest paid employees in the federal government, many are paid
more than the Vice-President per year, but it appears the high pay is
not enough for some.77 Increasingly, top scientists working for the
NIH are collecting paychecks and stock options from biomedical companies and, in some cases, even being named on patents. 78 Some
scientists have collected between $300,000 and $1.4 million
($1,400,000) over the last decade, while simultaneously accepting a
government salary. 79 While waiting for the NIH to respond to a request regarding the extent of the consulting activities, House leaders
were able to uncover roughly one-hundred consulting deals that were
not properly reviewed or reported to the NIH. 0
An independent panel, commissioned by the NIH, recommended
barring all senior NIH officials from accepting income from drug companies.8" And according to the panel recommendation, it was the
problem of approximately 120 of the 17,526 employees in the NIH.82
In response to the L.A. Times investigative articles and based on the
recommendations of the independent panel, the NIH Director Dr.
Zerhouni announced sweeping changes before a Congressional subcommittee, blaming the problem on the actions of a few.8 3 The L.A.
Times discovered that "at least 530 government scientists at the NIH
. have taken fees, stock or stock options from biomedical companies
in the last five years."8 4 When taken into consideration that the NIH
74. Id.
75. David Willman, NIH to Curb Its Scientists' Deals With Drug Firms, L.A.
TIMES, June 23, 2004, at At [hereinafter NIH to Curb Its Scientists' Deals].
76. Stealth Merger, supra note 2, at Al.
77. See id. "For instance, two prominent NIH laboratory leaders, [Jeffery] Schlom
and [Dr. Ronald N.] Germain, make $180,400 and $179,900, respectively ....
[Dr.
Stephen I.] Katz, 62, is paid $200,000 a year ..
" Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. NIH to Curb Its Scientists' Deals, supra note 75, at Al.
81. BLUE RIBBON PANEL ON CONFLICT OF INTEREST POLICIES, NAT'L INST. OF
HEALTH, REPORT OF THE NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH BLUE RIBBON PANEL ON CONFLICT OF INTEREST POLICIES 2-3 (2004) available at http://www.nih.gov/about/

ethicsCOI_panelreport.pdf.
82. Id. at 2.
83. NIH Ethics Hearing,supra note 5.
84. Public Servant, supra note 67, at Al.
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only employed 2025 individuals with Ph.D. or M.D. degrees in 2004,85
the prevalence is not as inconsequential as indicated by Dr. Zerhouni.
Although the changes were warmly greeted, there were holes in the
new proposal, such as allowing laboratory chiefs and study scientists
to have consulting agreements. 86 In response to the proposal, the Office of Government Ethics (OGE) issued a report stating that the NIH
is beset with a "permissive culture" and that current agencies proposals would not be sufficient.8 7 The OGE stated that strict "across-theboard restrictions were needed to restore public confidence in the nation's preeminent medical-research agency. ' 88 With "at least 530 government scientists at the NIH . . . haven taken fees, stock or stock
options from biomedical companies in the last five years,"8 9 drug
safety is clearly in question.9' And as Dr. Graham remarks, there are
five other drugs that require investigation as ticking time bombs.9
This may be the proverbial tip of the iceberg, as indicated by conflicts
of interest affecting vaccine safety.9"
D.

Conflicts of Interest in Vaccine Safety within the FDA and CDC

Are we too late? Vaccinations are considered a hallmark of 20th
and 21st century medicine, credited with controlling and even eliminating dangerous diseases.9" Although vaccines are acknowledged to
have risks, the benefit to society usually outweighs those risks.94 In
some cases, the benefit-risk balance may have been ignored. 95 For
example, the rotavirus vaccine RotaShield® approval, however, was
granted despite known serious risks such as intussusceptions
(0.05%),96 growth retardation (0.7%), and failure to thrive (0.5%).97
One-half of one percent may not seem significant until it is translated
into 1 out of 200 children or 19,000 children of the 3.8 million children
affected during trials. For intussusceptions alone, the mortality rate
with all treatments is 1% to 2% 98 (nineteen to thirty-eight children
per 3.8 million children). The vaccine, estimated to save less than
85. Nat'l Inst. Of Health, NIH Alamanac 2005-2006, at 578 (2005), available at
http://www.nih.gov/about/almanac/NIHAlmanac2OO5.pdf.
86. The Nation, supra note 9, at Al.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Public Servant, supra note 67, at Al.
90. See id.
91. Vioxx Hearings, supra note 9.
92. See Michael E. Horwin, Comment, Ensuring Safe, Effective and Necessary
Vaccines for Children, 37 CAL. W. L. REV. 321, 327 (2001).
93. See id.
94. See id. at 334-36.
95. See id.
96. Id. at 339.
97. Id. at 339 n.129.
98. Shaun C. Spalding & Bruce Evans, Intussusception, 36(11) EMERGENCY MED.
12, 19 (2004). This figure can be as high as 20% in rural areas of underdeveloped
nations. N. Tjarda van Heek, et al., Intussusception in a Tropical Country: Compari-
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twenty children per year, had a cost that eclipsed its benefit.9 9 A similar story is told regarding Prevnar and other vaccines. 0 Several of
these vaccines are for conditions that take between twenty and fifty
lives per year.11 Again, the presence of conflicts of interest in the
approval of these vaccines creates considerable doubt that many vacrisk, especially in light of the history of Prevnar
cines are worth the
10 2
and RotaShield®.
Two committees play key roles in U. S. vaccine policymaking-the
FDA's Vaccines and Related Biological Products Advisory Committee (VRBPAC) and the CDC's Advisory Committee on Immunization
Practices (ACIP). 1°3 Federal regulatory and administrative agencies
are often referred to as the fourth branch of government. 4 Federal
advisory committees that advise these agencies have grown sufficiently influential as to be called a fifth branch of government. 0 5 The
House of Representatives Government Reform Committee investigated these committees for conflicts of interest and produced a Majority Staff Report on August 21, 2000.106 The report determined that
the overwhelming majority of members of VRBPAC, both voting
members and consultants, have substantial ties to the pharmaceutical
industry. 10 7 The members were given blanket waivers for conflicts of
interest. 10 8 A similar story is told of the ACIP.
Some ACIP members did not fully disclose their conflicts of interest. 10 9 Contrary to established rules, some members sit on both committees.' 10 A ten member "rotavirus working committee" wrote the
of
RotaShield® recommendation during private meetings.1 1 1 Seven 112
interest.
of
conflicts
financial
had
members
committee
working
the
The investigation also revealed that the ACIP committee advising the
CDC had recommended the RotaShield® for universal use before the
vaccine was even approved by the FDA. 1 3 Not only did most members have financial ties to vaccine manufacturers, but the financial ties
son Among Patient Populationsin Jakarta,Jogyakarta,and Amsterdam, 29(4) J. PEDIATRIC GASTROENTEROLOGY & NUTRITION, 402, 402 (1999).
99. Horwin, supra note 92, at 333-34, 338-39.
100. See id. at 342-46.
101. See id. at 365-66.
102. See id. at 338-46, 366.
103. See MAJORITY STAFF REPORT ON VACCINE POLICY MAKING, supra note 9, at
1.
104. BREYER, supra note 10, at 37-38.
105. MAJORITY STAFF REPORT ON VACCINE POLICY MAKING, supra note 9, at 3.
106. Id. at 1.
107. Id. at 20.
108. Id. at 28.
109. Id. at 27.
110. Id. at 20.
111. Id. at 33.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 38.

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol12/iss2/7
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V12.I2.6

12

Krenik: “No One
Can Serve Two OF
Masters”:
A Separation
of Powers Solution f
20061
SEPARATION
POWERS
SOLUTION

included patent ownership on a similar rotavirus vaccine.114 The report concludes that the actions of these committees allowed private
special interest groups to unduly influence the government.11 5
It appears the message within the Majority Staff Report fell on deaf
ears. Five years after the Majority Staff Report was released,1 1 6 the
NIH and Vioxx conflicts of interest scandals were revealed.' 7 It is
clear that the Majority Report recommendations of the Government
Reform Committee have not satisfactorily addressed the problem.
Despite the efforts of Congress, the situation has not appeared to
have changed for the better as the conflicts of interest in the 2005
FDA advisory panel on COX-2 (Vioxx, Celebrex, and Bextra) safety
soundly demonstrate. 1 8 Perhaps the Vioxx disaster could have been
avoided if the recommendations had been broadly applied, and it is
possible that the situation is worse than it appears.
Has the problem quietly reached horrific proportions? Many independent scientists have found evidence linking childhood vaccines to
an increase in neurodevelopment delays (NDD) in children." 9 The
CDC estimates almost 400,000 children are affected by Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASDs).' 0 The expected costs of caring for these
children will exceed one trillion dollars. 2 ' Although ASDs used to
occur 1 in 10,000 children, over the last thirty years the figure has
grown to 1 in 166 children, which translates into 113,000 disabled children every four years.' 2 The ASD figure does not include most Neu114. Id. at 16.
115. See id. at 35-36.
116. Id. at 1.
117. Vioxx Hearing, supra note 9.
118. Press Release, Ctr. For Sci. in the Pub. Interest, supra note 60.
119. See David A. Geier & Mark R. Geier, Neurodevelopmental DisordersFollowing Thimerosal-ContainingChildhoodImmunizations: A Follow- Up Analysis, 23 Irrr'L
J. ToxIcoLoGY 369, 369-75 (2004); Amy S. Holmes et al., Reduced Levels of Mercury
in First Baby Haircutsof Autistic Children, 22 INT. J. ToxiCOLOGY 277, 277-84 (2003);
David S. Baskin et al., Thimerosal Induces DNA Breaks, Caspase-3 Activation, Membrane Damage, and Cell Death in Cultured Human Neurons and Fibroblasts,74 ToxiCOLOGY Sci. 361, 367-68 (2003); M. Waly et al., Activation of Methionine Synthaseby
by Insulin-Like Growth Factor-1 and Dopamine: A Target for Neurodevelopmental
Toxins and Thimerosal, 9 MOLECULAR PSYCHIATRY 358, 365, 367-68 (2004). These
NDDs include Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASDs) such as Autism, Asperger's Syndrome and Pervasive Delay Disorder (PDD), as well as Attention Deficit Disorder
(ADD), Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), Speech Delays and
Mental Retardation.
120. Vaccines and the Autism Epidemic: Reviewing the FederalGovernment's Track
Record and Chartinga Course for the Future: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Gov't
Reform, 107th Cong. (2002) [hereinafter 2002 Autism Hearings] (statement of U.S.
Rep. Dennis J. Kucinich (D-OH)).
121. Id.
122. Id.; Mark Blaxill, What's Going On? The Question of Time Trends in Autism.
119 Public Health Reports 536-51 (2004); AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS, AUTISM
A.L.A.R.M. 1 (2004), available at http://www.medicalhomeinfo.org/health/Autism%20downloads/AutismAlarm.pdf.
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rological Delay Disorders and Behavior Problems 123 which are now
reported to affect one in every six children, which based on the 2000
124
population census reports represents 639,000 children every year.
Conflicts of interest arise in even a wider context than just the government agencies of the DHHS, the very scientific literature they rely
on suffers from systematic conflicts of interest problems.1 25 The only
studies showing an actual negative relationship between Thimerosal
and Autism were conducted in Europe and the authors of those studies all have financial conflicts of interest.126 Most importantly, the authors of these studies represent a single network of authors that are all
tied, either indirectly or as employees, to a for-profit vaccine manufacturer that makes 80% of its profits from vaccines.127 The four key
authors of the network all hold key leadership positions with the vaccine manufacturer. 28 Additionally, the studies may not be informative for the United States, because Europe uses only one-third the
amount of Thimerosal in its vaccine products as compared to the
United States, and the studies also suffer from other protocol and statistical difficulties. 29 All three of the conflicted Danish studies were
cited by the Institute of Medicine (sponsored by the CDC) in concluding there was no link between Autism and Thimerosal.13 °
The link between Autism and Thimerosal has been consistently denied by the CDC.13 ' A simple MEDLINE 132 search, however, reveals
123. See generally Ctr. for Disease Control & Prevention, About Autism, http://
www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/dd/aic/about/default.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
124. AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS, supra note 122, at 1. A recent report published in
the Washington Post indicates that some experts now estimate that it is not uncommon for one in three children "to be diagnosed with a learning disability, developmental delay or behavioral disorder." Cathy Trost, Enter the Therapy Zone, WASH.
POST, Nov. 30, 2004, at Fl. See also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS 2000 PHC-T-9.
POPULATION BY AGE, SEX, RACE, AND HISPANIC OR LATINO ORIGIN FOR THE
UNITED STATES: 2000, available at http://www.census.gov/population/cen2000/phc-t9/

tab0l.pdf.
125. See generally Joel Lexchin et al., PharmaceuticalIndustry Sponsorship and Research Outcome and Quality: Systematic Review, 326 BMJ 1167-1170 (2003), available
at http://bmj.bmjjournals.com (search "Author" for "Lexchin"; then follow "Full
Text" hyperlink) (discussing funding of drug studies by the pharmaceutical industry).
126. See Anders Hviid et al., Association Between Thimerosal-ContainingVaccines
and Autism, 290 JAMA, 1763, 1763-66 (2003); Kreesten M. Madsen et al., Thimerosal
and the Occurrence of Autism: Negative Ecological Evidence from Danish PopulationBased Data, 112 PEDIATRICS 604, 604-05 (2003).
127. Safe Minds, Something is Rotten in Denmark (May 2004) http://www.safe
minds.org/pressroom/pressjreleases/20040518 AutismAuthorsNetwork.pdf.
128. Id.
129. Geier & Geier, supra note 119, at 374.
130. 150 CONG. REC. H4564, 4566-67 (daily ed. June 18, 2004) (statement of Rep.
Weldon).
131. See Nat'l Immunization Program, Ctrs. For Disease Control & Prevention,
Vaccines and Autism: An Institute of Medicine (IOM) Report (May 2004), http://
www.cdc.gov/nip/news/iom-thim5-18-04.htm; Nat'l Immunization Program, Ctrs. For
Disease Control & Prevention, Thimerosal & Vaccines: An Institute of Medicine
(IOM) Report (Apr. 2001), http://www.cdc.gov/nip/news/iom-thiml0-1-01.htm; cf.

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol12/iss2/7
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V12.I2.6

14

Krenik: “No SEPARATION
One Can Serve TwoOF
Masters”:
A Separation
of Powers Solution f
POWERS
SOLUTION
2006]

hundreds of medical peer reviewed articles that document the toxicity
of Thimerosal, including severe morbidity and mortality from high
level exposure.13 3 Further, vaccine policymaking appears to be lim1 34
ited to a small group of individuals who have conflicts of interest.
Hence, it would seem natural that such a defined group would be reluctant to disclose that there is the possibility that tainted policy contributed to disabling 400,000 children to date and possibly harming an
estimated 639,000 children every year.
Notwithstanding the CDC's denials, the possibility that some elements related to vaccines may have caused the Autism problem is not
an unreasonable proposition, albeit a frightening one. The incidence
of ASDs in children is very similar to the incidents of side-effects from
the RotaShield® vaccine mentioned above. The 1 out of 168 prevalence of ASD's in children is only 0.59%, which is between the 0.7%
growth retardation and 0.5% failure to thrive reports related to the
RotaShield® vaccine. Clearly this percentage of affect has occurred
before. In this case, the problem itself may have remained relatively
unnoticed until its growth rate became alarming, 135 and the cause may
be buried under private financial influence.
In addition to the private financial influence resulting from the consulting arrangements and the undue influence exerted by private interests in the advisory committees, there may be one more major
factor for considering the privatized nature of the DHHS. 1 36 U.S.
Representative Maurice D. Hinchey (D-NY) reported to the House
Appropriations Committee that the FDA receives nearly 50% of its
funding for drug regulation from the drug companies, 137 and this percentage is increasing. 38 Congressman Hinchey recognizes there are
problems with regard to the relationship the FDA has with the entities
CTR. FOR BIOLOGICS EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., THIMEROSAL IN VACCINES (2004), http://www.fda.gov/cber/vaccine/thimerosal.htm (re-

porting the FDA's conclusion that Thimerosal poses no threat).
132. MEDLINE is an online bibliographic database produced by the U.S. National
Library of Medicine covering worldwide biomedical literature. About MEDLINE,
http://medline.cos.com/docs/abmedl.shtml (last visited Feb. 1, 2006).
133. Truth Revealed: New Scientific Discoveries Regarding Mercury in Medicine and
Autism: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Human Rights and Wellness of the
Comm. On Gov't Reform, 108th Cong. 102 (2004) microformed on CIS No. 2005H401-61 (Cong. Info. Serv.) [hereinafter Nov. 2004 Autism Hearings] (statement by
Lyn Redwood, RN, MSN, President of Coalition for Safeminds).
134. See MAJORITY STAFF REPORT ON VACCINE POLICY MAKING, supra note 9.
135. See generally Mark F. Blaxill, What's Going On? The Question of Time Trends
in Autism, 119 Pub. Health Rep. 536-50 (2004) (discussing the increasing trend of
autism in the United States and the United Kingdom).
136. U.S. Representative Henry Bonilla (R-TX) Holds Hearing on Food and Drug
Administration Before the House Appropriations Committee, 108th Cong. (Jul. 26,
2005) [hereinafter FDA Hearings].
137. Id.
138. Id.
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that they are regulating under existing law. 13 9 The pervasive conflicts
of interest and privatization of the DHHS calls into question just how
the agency fits within our constitutional legal system both in terms of
the separation of powers and the nondelegation doctrines.
III.

SEPARATION OF POWERS IN THE CONSTITUTION

Under the separation of powers doctrine, the prohibitions against
encroachment and the nondelegation represent two sides of the same
sword: one prohibits taking too much power,14 ° while the other prohibits giving away too much power.'4 1 Both variations cut against the
1 42
accumulation of too much power in any one branch of government.
As such, to say that nondelegation is dead is the equivalent of saying
that separation of powers cannot exist.
A.

Separations of Powers

Separation of powers is a foundational concept of our constitutional
legal system originating from the three independent branches of powers found in the Constitution itself.1 43 The basic concepts of separation of powers can be seen as far back as the works of Aristotle where
he describes methods of setting up constitutions in relation to three
powers: deliberative, executive, and judicial. 14 4 Modern approaches
followed the philosophies of Montesquieu, built upon and refined by
Madison and Jefferson. 145 Madison, a Federalist, wrote that "[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the
same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary,
self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny. ' ' 146 These views were echoed by Thomas Jefferson, an
anti-Federalist, who called the concentration of the three powers, "the
definition of despotic government. 1 47 Framers had obvious concerns
139. Id.
140. See generally Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 436-47 (1998); INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944-52 (1983); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579, 587-589 (1952).
141. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935);
Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 420-30 (1935).
142. See Clinton, 524 U.S. at 436-47. In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy states:
"Liberty is always at stake when one or more of the branches seek to transgress the
separation of powers. Separation of powers was designed to implement a fundamental insight: concentration of power in the hands of a single branch is a threat to liberty." Id. at 450.
143. U.S. CONST. art. I-II.
144. THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 188-203 (Ernest Barker trans., Oxford Univer-

sity Press, 1962) (1858) (noting the Greek understanding of the three branches was
significantly different than modern functions).
145. BREYER, supra note 10, at 37.

146. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 139 (James Madison) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 1981).
147. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA (William Peden ed.,
Univ. of N.C. Press 1982) (1781).
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for avoiding the creation of a tyranny by the accumulation
of too
148
much power within one branch of the government.
Separation of powers is not considered a pure separation, meaning,
the three branches are not so isolated as to prevent exertion of control
on one another.149 Madison made this intent clear by noting that the
"magistrate in whom the whole executive power resides cannot of
himself make a law ... nor administer justice in person, though has
the appointment of those who do administer it."'15 0
The system of checks and balances is a prime example of the Framers' intent to allow interaction between the branches, especially for
the purpose of control of the branches. 51 The President's power to
veto legislation and the Congress's power to override a veto demonstrate that some interaction is intended not to violate the separation of
powers but there is a distinction of wielding the power and exercising
control over the power. 1 52 These powers do not imply that the President can exercise legislative power or that the Congress can exercise
executive power, because as a fundamental restriction, 5 3 the President does not enact legislation1 54 and the Congress may not execute
55
the law.'
The formalist and the functionalist theories represent two modern
156
approaches for discussing issues surrounding separation of powers.
The formalist approach requires that the three functions of legislative,
executive, and judicial must be strictly relegated to respective
148. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison), supra note 146, at 139.
149. See id. at 140
150. Id. (Madison also provides analogous limitations for the Judicial and Legislative branches.).
151. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison).
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952) (holding that the President's duty to faithfully execute the laws "refutes the idea that he is
to be a lawmaker"); cf Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981) (holding
that the President was acting in pursuance of Congress's implicit approval). However,
approval by Congressional acquiescence is questionable as it prevents the system of
checks and balances to operate because Presidential veto becomes meaningless and
implies Presidential power whenever Congress has not explicitly forbid it. JESSE H.
CHOPER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 154 (9th ed. West Group 2001). The Supreme
Court expressed a similar concern in Clinton v. New York, 523 U.S. 417, 439 (1998),
where it argued that although the Constitution provides a role for the President in
enacting laws, it is silent concerning unilateral action that repeals or amends a duly
enacted statute implying that enacting or repealing of statutes must follow the same
process. 524 U.S. 417, 439 (1998).
155. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 732-34 (1986) (holding unconstitutional
the Comptroller General's authorization to review the executive deficit estimates and
require the President to cut the budget of the federal government). The Comptroller
General was considered a legislative officer, and as such, was prohibited from exercising executive power, therefore the Supreme Court held the procedure was unconstitutional. Id.
156. Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and OrderedLiberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV.
1513, 1522-24 (1991).
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branches of the government.15 7 The functionalist approach only requires that the respective branches retain exclusive jurisdiction over
"core" functions that cannot be usurped, but allows for ebb and flow
of power between the branches.1 5 8 Under the formalist model, there
can be no inter-branch interference not expressly authorized by the
Constitution and separation of powers disputes are to be resolved
predominantly by classification of function.15 9 Functionalism contrasts with formalism by allowing inter-branch blending, and dispute
resolution is analyzed by reference to characteristic functions of separation of powers such as maintaining a system of checks and balances,
preventing excessive concentrations of powers, and protecting individual liberty. 6 ° Nonetheless, they all agree as a minimum that the separation of the core powers, a system of checks and balances, and the
prohibition against excessive concentrations of power in a single
branch is fundamental to our constitutional government.1 6 1
This Author submits that, with the exception of a Constitutional
amendment, it should be irrelevant on how the excessive power arrives at the concentration point. The existence of an excessive concentration of power violates a foundational principle of the
Constitution.1 62 Madison's concern regarding the commingling of any
two primary powers within the same hands is very clear. 163 This is
evident in the very structure of the Constitution when it states: "All
legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress... "
"[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President... ," and "[t]he
judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish."' 6 4 The Constitution does not appear to
say all legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress
and sometimes in a President.1 6 5 Therefore, to the extent that the
power of the three distinct powers accumulates within the providence
of a single branch of government, there exists tension, if not outright
violation, with the separation of powers
doctrine and the structure of
166
the Constitution of the United States.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1528-31.
159. See CHOPER, supra note 154, at 155-56.
160. Id. According to Rebecca L. Brown, as a good reference, these two views
generally encapsulate the dichotomy presented by various constitutional interpretive
methodologies: originalist v. non-originalist; neo-classical v. pragmatic; de-evolutionary v. evolutionary; judicial literalism v. judicial interpretation, although each group
holds a violation based on different criteria. Brown, supra note 156, at 1522-32.
161. CHOPER, supra note 154, at 155-56.
162. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison).
163. See id.
164. U.S. CONST. art I, §1, art. II, §1, & art. III, §1.
165. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §1.
166. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §1, art. II, §1, & art. III, §1; THE FEDERALIST No. 48
(James Madison).
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Madison was very concerned with providing an effective system of
checks and balances to restrain encroachment by one department of
the government into another department's area of power. 1 67 It is clear
that Madison, following the philosophy of Montesquieu, was very conpowers by one department of
cerned that the exercise of two distinct
168
government would lead to tyranny.
When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same
person or body ... there can be no liberty, because apprehensions
may arise lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical
laws to execute them in a tyrannical manner ...[w]ere the power of
judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject
would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would then be
the judge might
the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power,
169
behave with all the violence of an oppressor.
But compare the Madison-Montesquieu view to commentator Harold
J. Krent: "Thus, if Congress fashions policy itself or delegates authority to the executive branch, the ultimate policy adopted is the product
of at least two branches of government and is subject to the continuing check of at least one other coordinate branch."' 7 ° Although it is
clear that Madison would not agree with Krent, because Madison considers the combination of any two branches of government as a flirtation with tyranny, even Krent is sensitive to a lack of checks and
balances. 1 7 1 Consequently, when effective checks and balances do not
exist, then separation of powers becomes tenuous because power has
an encroaching nature and there would be nothing to limit a single
branch from adopting all three different powers of government. 7 2 In
in a unitary
essence, one cannot have a system of checks and balances
1 73
power system no matter how limited the combination.
Separation of powers, although actively invoked by name to prevent encroachment by one branch of the government into the power
reserved to another, 74 is usually called by another name when invalidating unsupportable grants of power from one branch to another: the
nondelegation doctrine. 7 5 In terms of legislative grants of power to
the Executive Branch, the nondelegation doctrine, by its very nature,
(in one of its aspects) is a particular manifestation of the parent sepa167. See
168. See

THE FEDERALIST
THE FEDERALIST

No. 48 (James Madison), supra note 146, at 149.
No. 47 (James Madison), supra note 146, at 140.

169. Id. at 141.
170. Harold J. Krent, Fragmentingthe Unitary Executive: CongressionalDelegations
of Administrative Authority Outside the Federal Government, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 62,
75-76 (1991).

171. Id.; see

THE FEDERALIST

No. 48 (James Madison).

172. See generally THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47, 48 (James Madison).
173. See generally id.; Krent, supra note 170, at 75-76.
174. See generally Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998); INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919, 944-46 (1983); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579
(1952).
175. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989).
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ration of powers doctrine-the legislature cannot delegate its power
to another branch.17 6
B.

The Nondelegation Doctrine

The nondelegation doctrine has it roots in the separation of powers
doctrine that underlies the tripartite system of government established
by the Constitution. 177 The nondelegation doctrine prohibits the delegation of the legislative power granted under Article I, Section 1 of
the United States Constitution which states that "[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the Unites States,
which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives. ' 178 The
Supreme Court has, for more than a century, interpreted this vesting
clause as prohibiting Congress from delegating, either by abdicating
179
or transferring, its legislative powers to another branch or entity.
The principle "that Congress cannot delegate legislative power... is a
principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution."' 810
These restraints against delegation, however, are not absolute.' 8
Conflicting with the prohibition on delegation, the Constitution in
Article I, Section I, empowers Congress "[t]o make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution" its general
powers. 182 As a competing provision of legislative vesting, the necessary and proper clause provides a premise to delegate subordinate
183
rule making as long as the legislative power itself is not delegated.
However, in considering this clause in terms of legislative delegations,
the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the necessity of adapting legislation to manage the host of details with which a national Legislature cannot deal directly.' 8 4 It is also recognized that the
Constitution has never been regarded as denying Congress the flexibility and practicality that allows them to lay down policies and establish standards, while leaving the details to selected agents. 8 5
The power of necessity and practicality is not limited to delegations
to the Executive Branch. 186 The Supreme Court in Panama Refining
Co. v. Ryan stated that it could "find nothing in the Constitution
176. Id. at 371-72.
177. Id. at 371.

178. U.S.

CONST. art. I, § 1.
179. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001); Loving v.
United States, 517 U.S. 748, 758 (1996); Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 371-72; A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935); Pan. Ref. Co. v.
Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892).
180. Field, 143 U.S. at 692.
181. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372.
182. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
183. See Schechter, 295 U.S. at 529; Pan. Ref. Co., 293 U.S. at 421.
184. See Pan. Ref. Co., 293 U.S. at 421.
185. See id.
186. See id.
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which restricts the Congress to the selection of the President as
grantee," and that "[t]he Congress may vest the power in the officer of
its choice or in a board or commission" as it creates or deems necessary. 18 7 It was not long before the Supreme Court found an agent that
188
was constitutionally unavailable for delegation: private interest.
Clearly contained within the clause is the power that enables Congress
to create laws providing for the discretion of the Executive Branch in
the execution of laws.189 But when does discretion become rule making power?
Necessity changed dramatically during the latter part of the 19th
century and early 20th century due to the Great Depression. 90 Prior
to 1935, permissible Congressional delegation took three forms: the
factual determination (the contingency theory), filling up the details
and the validity of rule making, and the intelligible principle that
eventually allowed broad delegations based on equally broad policy
statements.' 9 1
1. Factual Determination by the Delegate
One early form of allowable discretion was the contingency theory. 192 The contingency theory allowed Congress to delegate to an
executive official the determination of a factual contingency to an executive official that would implement the statute. 9 3 An example of
this is found in Field v. Clark, where the Supreme Court upheld a
provision of the Tariff Act of 1890, which authorized the President to
suspend favorable tariff treatments for nations that imposed duties on
American products which he found to be unequal or unreasonable. 194
The essential difference is a distinction adopted in Field between the
"delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as
to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law."' 95
This is the most innocuous form of delegation, where implicitly no
power was actually conferred to the Executive Branch, just the ability
to execute the law with discretion that is limited to fact-finding
activities. 9 6
187. 293 U.S. at 420.
188. See Schechter, 295 U.S. at 537.
189. See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
190. See BREYER, supra note 10, at 45. The impact of the Great Depression propelled the need to create administrative agencies to regulate the economy. Id.
191. See J.W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 394; United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506
(1911); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
192. See Field, 143 U.S. at 683.
193. See id. at 692-93; Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schechter Poultry at the Millennium:
A Delegation Doctrine for the Administrative State, 109 YALE L.J. 1399, 1403 (2000).
194. Field, 143 U.S. at 692.
195. Id. at 693-94.
196. See id. at 692.
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The discretion delegated based on factual contingency resembles
the fact-finding and discretionary implementation that occurs in any
executive action, that is, the initial application of a rule or law to a
factual situation. 197 Therefore, the contingency theory of delegation
only recognizes an already existing 198executive power to be exercised
under and in pursuance of the law.
2.

Filling Up the Details

The necessity for delegation outgrew factual contingency implementations to allow the grantee the "power to fill up the details."' 19 9 The
Supreme Court in United States v. Grimaud,2 °° upheld a statute that
gave the Secretary of Agriculture broad authority in protecting the
public forests and reservations including the authority to make rules
to regulate the occupancy and use, and to protect the forests from
destruction.2 °1 The Supreme Court reasoned that it was impractical
for Congress to provide general regulations for detailed management
and authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to meet the local conditions was a simple delegation of administrative functions.2 °2
Congress was merely conferring administrative functions upon an
agent, and not delegating to him legislative power. The authority
actually given was much less than what has been granted to municipalities by virtue of which they make by-laws, ordinances and regulations for the government of towns and cities. Such ordinances do
not declare general rules with reference to rights of persons and
property, nor do they create or regulate obligations and liabilities,
20 3
nor declare what shall be crimes nor fix penalties therefor.
The GrimaudCourt went further to explain that because the functions
"are not of a legislative character in the highest sense of the term," it
was permissible for Congress to delegate to the local legislature the
authority to determine minor matters.20 4
3.

The Intelligible Principle Requirement

The final form of the delegation requirement involves the requirement that the statute must provide an intelligible principle.20 5 The
20 6
delegation authorized in J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States,
where the Supreme Court upheld a statute giving the President, at his
discretion, the power to revise tariff duties already specified in the
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

See id. at 693.
See id. at 693-94.
United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 517 (1911).
220 U.S. 506 (1911).
Id.
Id. at 516.

203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
206. Id.
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statute whenever necessary to equalize local productions costs with
those of competing countries.2 °7 The Court held that the delegation
was not prohibited as long as Congress legislates "an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [act] is directed to
conform. ' 20 1 In its analysis, the Court found the statute to be perfectly intelligible-that Congress had described "with clearness" its
policy and plan that authorized a member of the Executive Branch to
make factual determinations regarding changing conditions, and then
implement necessary rate adjustments to conform to the standards
contained within the policy and plan. 2° 9 As the needs of administrative regulation grew, so did the flexibility allowed by the Supreme
Court in terms of broad delegation, initially from a determination of
criteria under the rule, to merely an intelligible principal guiding the
actions of the Executive.210 The latter gives way to the broad general
directives.
4.

Broad General Directives

The Supreme Court, "driven by a practical understanding that in
our increasingly complex society," has consistently held that "Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power
under broad general directives."' 211 "Without capacity to give authorizations of that sort we should have the anomaly of a legislative power
which in many circumstances calling for its exertion would be but a
futility. '2 12 In essence, given the complexity of our society, Congress
could not be successful if it were required to legislate every detail.21 3
As a result, the Supreme Court has deemed it "constitutionally sufficient if Congress clearly delineates the general policy, the public
agency which
is to apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated
214
authority."
From the founding of the Federal government, Congress has conferred to executive officers the power to make regulations, but only
207. Id.
208. Id. at 409.
209. Id. at 405.
210. See generally Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935); J.W. Hampton,
276 U.S. at 394; Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892).
211. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989); see also Loving v. United
States, 517 U.S. 748, 758 (1996); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495, 530 (1935); Pan. Ref Co., 293 U.S. at 421; Field, 143 U.S. at 692-94.
212. Pan. Ref. Co., 293 U.S. at 421.
213. See id.
214. Mistretta,488 U.S. at 372-73. This is remarkably similar to the requirement of
legislative action in Panama Refining that states "[a]ccordingly we look to the statute
to see whether the Congress has declared a policy with respect to that subject;
whether the Congress has set up a standard for the President's action; whether the
Congress has required any finding by the President in the exercise of the authority to
enact the prohibition." Pan. Ref. Co., 293 U.S. at 415.
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for the purpose of administering the laws. a1 5 Although the regulations
are binding rules of conduct, "they are valid only as subordinate
rules," and only when they do not exceed the Legislature's "sufficiently defined" policy framework. 6 The Supreme Court in Panama
Refining, speaking about the delegation in Grimaud, distinguished between rules and laws, which results in a crucial distinction.2 1 7 More
recent cases accept rule making as distinct from Congressional law
making authority while concentrating on determining if there exists an
"intelligible principle" in the contested legislation.2 18
However, Justice Stevens and Justice Souter of the current Supreme
Court would do away with the distinction and concentrate on acknowledging that it is "legislative power. 21 9 This does not necessarily
mean the delegation was unconstitutional as indicated in the Mistretta
analysis, which relied more on the system of checks and balances to
provide the necessary protection against tyranny.2 20 Further, the distinction between a "law" and a "rule" provides a loophole for constitutional delegation of the legislative power by distinguishing between
a law that prescribes the policy and limits of rule-making authority
and a rule that is made within limits prescribed by a law. 22 1 Legislation conferring subordinate rule-making authority does not transfer
any meaningful legislative power because it does not confer the power
to make policy, and therefore, does not violate the nondelegation requirement.2 2 In essence, only laws may make policy and rules do
not-the rule must only provide for conduct in furtherance of the policy and standards set by the law.223 Accordingly, the Court in Mistretta notes that it is "constitutionally sufficient if Congress clearly
which is to apply it, and
delineates the general policy, the public agent
2 24
the boundaries of this delegated authority.,
Justice Stevens and Justice Souter are not alone in their concern for
the current formulation of law-rule distinction using and intelligible
principle standard, as seen in Justice Thomas's concurrence in
Whitman:
I am not convinced that the intelligible principle doctrine serves to
prevent all cessions of legislative power. I believe that there are
215. See Pan. Ref Co., 293 U.S. at 421.
216. Id. at 428-29 (emphasis added).
217. Id.
218. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 530 (1935);
Pan. Ref Co., 293 U.S. at 429-30; but see Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S.
457, 472-74 (2001); Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 371-74.
219. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 488 (Stevens, J., and Souter, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added).
220. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 380-81.
221. See Pan. Ref. Co., 293 U.S. at 428-29.
222. Id.
223. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 371-74; Schechter, 295 U.S. at 530; Pan. Ref. Co., 293
U.S. at 421; J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
224. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372-73.
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cases in which the principle is intelligible and yet the significance of
the delegated decision is simply too great for the decision to be
called anything other than "legislative."
As it is, none of the parties to these cases has examined the text
of the Constitution or asked us to reconsider our precedents on cessions of legislative power. On a future day, however, I would be
willing to address the question whether our delegation jurisprudence has strayed too far from our Founders' understanding of separation of powers.22 5
Either in terms of the recognizing the legislative power or the law-rule
distinction the concern is the same-delegations may enable the Executive branch to wield legislative powers contrary to the principles of
separation of powers as set out by Madison.2 26 In addition, the Court
in Carterv. Carter Coal Co. held a delegation unconstitutional despite
the expression of an intelligible principle, so there must be something
more to constraining delegation than an intelligible principle.22 7
On the other hand, the logic of delegation under the rule-law distinction represents a neat package-there is no delegation because
Congress has enacted a law, set the policy, standards and boundaries,
and the delegation is merely subordinate rule making authority.22 8 As
demonstrated in both the "filling up the details" and the "intelligible
principle" tests, necessity has pushed the applicable effect of nondelegation far away from mere executive discretion and administrative
rule-making to delegations under the broad general directives. 2 9 If
the sole requirement is that broad general directives and some intelligible boundaries are sufficient to delegate legislative authority, then
logically, only the most boundless or unintelligible legislative delegations could possibly be considered an unconstitutional delegation,
which has clearly been the result.2 3
C.

Nondelegatable Legislation

'
Often criticized as only having "one good year," 231
critics of the
nondelegation doctrine decry it dead on arrival, claiming it has only
been used twice to invalidate statutes and would rename the nondelegation doctrine as the delegation doctrine due to the courts' tendency
to uphold delegations of legislative power.2 3 2 It would appear that
reports of its demise have been greatly exaggerated, because, not only

225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Whitman v. Am.Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 487 (2001).
THtE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison).
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936).
See Pan. Ref Co., 293 U.S. at 421.
See Mistretta, 488 U.S at 372-73.
See Whitman, 531 U.S. at 474-75 (2001).
BREYER, supra note 10, at 44.
See Marci A. Hamilton, Representation and Nondelegation: Back to Basics, 20
CARDOZO L. REV. 807, 807 (1999).
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are there additional cases involving nondelegation,2 3 3 the nondelegation doctrine has shown up in different forms.2 34 It is clear that both
prior to and after the traditional nondelegation doctrine's "one good
year," statutes have not been struck down for lacking an intelligible
principle. 23 5 But, limiting the statement to "statutes" and "lacking an
intelligible principle" does not paint the entire picture for the
nondelegation doctrine. 36 PanamaRefining and Schechter are not the
only times that legislation, including ordinances, have been struck
down under principles expressed by the nondelegation doctrine, especially in the area of delegations to private parties. 2 37 The nondelegation doctrine takes on many forms and some of these forms are well
disguised.23 8
1.

Traditional Nondelegation

In 1935, the nondelegation doctrine found its voice when the Supreme Court used the nondelegation doctrine to strike down legislation in two cases: Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan 239 and A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States. 240 These two cases establish,
respectively, that the unconstitutional delegation of Congressional
rule making authority can be classed in two forms: (1) those that lack
any appreciable standard, and (2) those that allow the promulgation
of rules after the involvement of private groups in the legislative process.2 4 1 "In both Schechter and PanamaRefining, the Court concluded
that Congress had failed to articulate any policy or standard that
would serve to confine the discretion of the authorities to whom Con-

gress had delegated power. "242
2.

Boundless verses Broad Delegations

The Supreme Court in Panama Refining stated that although delegation has been given wide range, it still cannot be "allowed to ob233. See generally AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Util. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999); Carter v.
Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Washington ex. rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v.
Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928); Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912).
234. Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 336 (2000)
(arguing that nondelegation has changed into a set of nondelegation canons forbidding extraterritorial application of national law, intrusions on state sovereignty, decisions harmful to Native Americans, and absolutist approaches to health and safety).
235. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S 361, 373 (1989).
236. See generally AT&T Corp., 525 U.S. at 366; Carter, 298 U.S. at 238; Roberge,
278 U.S. at 116; Eubank, 226 U.S. at 137.
237. See AT&T Corp., 525 U.S. at 366; Carter,298 U.S. at 238 (1936); Roberge, 278
U.S. at 116; Eubank, 226 U.S. at 137.
238. See Sunstein, supra note 171, at 329-37.
239. 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
240. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
241. E. H. Schopler, Annotation, Delegation of Legislative Power to Nongovernmental Agencies as Regards Prices, Wages, and Hours, 3 A.L.R.2d 188 § 3 (1949).
242. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 n.7 (1989).
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scure the limitations of authority to delegate, if our constitutional
system is to be maintained. 2 43 In pursuing these limitations, Panama
Refining struck down § 9(c) of the National Industry Recovery Act
(NIRA),2 4 4 which provided for Presidential authority to prohibit the
transportation of the amount of petroleum or petroleum products produced in excess of the state's permission.2 4 5 The Court in Panama
Refining looked for three elements: (1) whether Congress had declared a policy with respect to the subject; (2) whether Congress had
established a standard for the President's action; and (3) whether
Congress had required the agent to make any findings in the exercise
of the authority to enact the prohibition.2 4 6 In its analysis, the Court
determined that the statute gave the President unlimited power to determine policy and to declare prohibitory law.24 7 Throwing off arguments of Presidential good will, the Court established that potential
benefits, deleterious consequences, and the President's good will toward self-limitation would not affect the decision-the issue was a
matter of law, not motives. 248 More generally, the Court found that
the statute did not establish policy or present standards and it failed to
provide guidance for the exercise of the delegated authority, and,
therefore, it was an unconstitutional delegation.2 4 9
In every case where the constitutionality of delegation had been
raised prior to Panama Refining, the Court has recognized that there
are limits to delegation which there is no constitutional authority to
transcend.2 5 ° The Court in Panama Refining held that § 9(c) went beyond those limits and, if upheld, it would be "idle to pretend that anything would be left of limitations upon the power of the Congress to
delegate its law-making function."2 '5 1 Upholding § 9(c) would render
the constitutional prohibition in Article I meaningless. 2
The Schechter case represents either form of unconstitutional delegation because it both lacked appreciable standards and involved private parties within the legislative process. 25 3 Schechter challenged a
different section of the NIRA. Section 3(d) shockingly allowed the
President:
[u]pon his own motion... [and] after such public notice and hearing
as he shall specify, may prescribe and approve a code of fair compe243. Pan. Ref Co., 293 U.S. at 421.
244. National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (15 U.S.C.

§ 709(c)), invalidated by Schecther, 295 U.S. 495.
245. Pan. Ref. Co., 293 U.S. at 415.
246. Id.
247.
248.
which
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Id.

Id. at 420. "The point is not one of motives but of constitutional authority, for
the best of motives is not a substitute." Id.
Id. at 430.
Id.
Id.
Id.
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
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tition for such trade or industry or subdivision thereof, which shall
have the same effect as a code of fair competition approved by the
President under subsection (a) of this section.2 54
In terms of boundless delegations, the Court analyzed § 3 and concluded that it provided no standards.2 5 1 "Instead of prescribing rules
256
of conduct, it authorize[d] the making of codes to prescribe them.
Due to the broad declarations coupled with few restrictions, the President's discretion was unfettered. 7
Broad delegations have been upheld on multiple occasions.2 5, A
recent decision described the contested statute in Schechter as "confer[ing] authority to regulate the entire economy on the basis of no
more precise a standard than stimulating the economy by assuring fair
competition. 2 59 The distinction may not be obvious when contrasting
the limiting criteria of this decision with other broad delegations
based on general restrictions. A good example is the authorization of
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) "to modify the structure of holding company systems so as to ensure they are not unduly
or unnecessarily complicate[d] and do not unfairly or inequitably distribute voting power among security holders."2 60 The distinction, in
Schecter, is in the sweeping powers invested in the President himself
and not to the Executive Branch.2 6 1 The power delegated was to create law "on his own motion," without limitation, resulting in an econ2 62
omy run by the President alone, reminiscent of rule by decree.
Despite holding up broad delegations, it is clear that when no policy,
standards, and guidance are provided by the Legislature during the
delegation of legislative power to the Executive Branch, the law results in a violation of the nondelegation doctrine and the separation of
powers.2 6 3

254. Id. at 522, n.4 (emphasis added).
255. Id. at 541.
256. Id. "It supplies no standards for any trade, industry or activity. It does not
undertake to prescribe rules of conduct to be applied to particular states of fact determined by appropriate administrative procedure. Instead of prescribing rules of conduct, it authorizes the making of codes to prescribe them." Id.
257. Id. at 541-42. "In view of the scope of that broad declaration, and of the
nature of the few restrictions that are imposed, the discretion of the President in approving or prescribing codes, and thus enacting laws for the government of trade and
industry throughout the country, is virtually unfettered." Id.
258. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 373-74 (1989).
259. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001).
260. Id. at 474.
261. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 538-39.
262. Id.at 539; see BREYER, supra note 10, at 37.
263. See Schechter, 295 U.S. at 538-42.
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3.

Delegations to Private Parties

The Court in Schechter also attacked delegations to private parties.26 4 In fact, at least six Supreme Court cases deal with the delegation of rule making functions to private parties between the years 1912
and 1939.265 The government in Schechter argued that the codes to
regulate competition created under NIRA would consist of rules and
regulations deemed fair by representatives of affected industry-by
those most vitally concerned and familiar with the problems.2 6 6 The
Court held that Congress could not delegate its "legislative authority
to trade or industrial associations or groups"-that is, privately interested parties-and that these private groups could not "be constituted
legislative bodies . .. [just] because such associations or groups are
familiar with the problems" at hand. 67 The Court soundly rejected
these claims by stating that "[s]uch a delegation of legislative power is
unknown to our law and is utterly inconsistent with the constitutional
prerogatives and duties of Congress. '2 68 Hence, the legislative vesting
clause not only applies to when the power is delegated to another
branch, but when the legislature abdicates power.
This was not the first time, nor the last, that the Supreme Court
would invalidate delegations to private parties.2 69 In an earlier case,
Eubank v. City of Richmond, the Supreme Court struck down an ordinance that allowed two-thirds of voters on any one street to effectively
set their preferred building line. 270 According to the ordinance, the
public committee was bound by the petition of the voters, which left
no discretion to the committee and effectively delegated law making
functions to private parties. 27 ' Again, in 1928, the Supreme Court in
State of Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge,27 2 struck
down an ordinance that required approval by two-thirds of voters who
owned property within 400 feet of a site designated to provide a philanthropic home for children or old people.2 7 3 The ordinance effectively gave owners of less than one-half of surrounding land the power
to make the decision "uncontrolled by any standard or rule prescribed
by legislative action." 274 And just like in Eubank, the public official264. Id. at 537.
265. See United States v. Rock Royal Co-op, Inc., 307 U.S. 533 (1939); Currin v.
Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 (1939); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Schechter,
295 U.S. 495 (1935); State of Washington ex. rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge,
278 U.S. 116 (1928); Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912).
266. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 537.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. See Carter,298 U.S. at 238; Roberge, 278 U.S. at 116; Eubank, 226 U.S. at 137.
270. Eubank, 226 U.S. at 144.
271. Id. at 143.
272. Washington ex. rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928).
273. Id. at 118.
274. Id. at 121-22.
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the superintendent in this case-was again bound by the decision of
the property owners. 5
Following Eubank and Roberge and the establishment of the traditional nondelegation doctrine, the Supreme Court in Carter v. Carter
Coal Co. invalidated a statute that delegated the power to fix maximum hours and minimum wages to the producers of two-thirds of annual tonnage of coal, and the majority of workers.2 76 The effect was
to subject the dissentient minority to compulsory acceptance at the
decision of the majority.2 77 Hence, once again an example of an adversely interested private party being given control of a third party's
private interests.2 7 8 As the Court noted: "This is legislative delegation
in its most obnoxious form; for it is not even delegation to an official
or an official body, presumptively disinterested, but to private persons
whose interests may be and often are adverse to the interests of others
in the same business. '279 Fundamental to the holding is that "one person may not be entrusted with the power to regulate the business of
another, and especially a competitor" and that legislation conferring
such power is both "intolerable" and "unconstitutional. ' 280 The
Court in Carterdispatched the delegation as "clearly arbitrary, and so
clearly a denial of [the] rights safeguarded by the due process clause
of the Fifth Amendment .... 281
In direct contrast to Roberge and Eubank, in 1939 the Supreme
Court upheld two alleged delegations to private parties in Currin v.
Wallace2 8 2 and in United States v. Rock Royal Coop.28 3 In both cases,
the rule promulgated by the Secretary of the agency was subject to the
approval to those it directly affected. 84 The Court in Currin held that
the delegation to the Secretary was constitutional because the statute
set forth the policy, standards, and requirements of findings.2 8 5 The
dispute was over the Secretary of Agriculture's designation of a market for tobacco inspection and grading pursuant to the Tobacco Inspection Act.28 6 He was required to designate markets where tobacco
was bought and sold at auction, but could not designate the market
unless two-thirds of the growers favored it by voting on a proscribed
referendum.2 8 7 A primary contested issue was the involvement of the
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

Id. at 122.
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 310 (1936).
Id. at 311.
See id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 311.
Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 (1939).
United States v. Rock Royal Coop, Inc., 307 U.S. 533 (1939).
Currin, 306 U.S. at 16; Rock Royal, 307 U.S. at 547.
Currin, 306 U.S. at 16-17.
Id. at 6.
Id.
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private parties in the decision of the market designation.2 88 The Court
also found that there was no legislative delegation to private parties
because Congress merely placed a restriction on its own regulation by
withholding its operation in a market unless two-thirds of the growers
approved it. 289 Notably, the delegation was considered as two separate determinations by the court, implying that a situation can exist
where a proper delegation was made by statute might nevertheless be
found invalid because it delegates to private parties.2 9 0
The Court explicitly distinguished the Currin situation from Carter
where a group of producers make the law and enforce it upon a minority, and from Roberge where the prohibition of legitimate land use
is imposed by other property owners rather than by legislature.2 91
Congress has the power to make the law regardless of the approval; it
only created a condition of going into effect made dependent on the
approval by voters in a certain district.2 92 On one hand, in Eubank,
the voter imposed a rule and the public official was bound by the decision, but in Currin the Secretary imposed a rule, but was bound by the
decision of voters. 293 Therefore, this was not a prohibition imposed by
private parties on other private parties; rather, it was the action of a
presumptively disinterested public party where the prohibition could
294
not be imposed without the approval of the affected private parties.
Similarly, in Rock Royal, the rule promulgated by the Secretary of
Agriculture required a similar approval to fix milk prices.29 5 The Secretary after determining findings based upon hearings could set prices
by issuance of an order.2 9 6 When the order is created without a special determination by the Secretary and the approval of the President,
the order must be approved by the milk handlers to become effective. 297 Notwithstanding rejection by the handlers, the order could become effective, with approval of the President, and by a vote of twothirds of the producers.2 98
The Court examined three issues of delegation: (1) delegation to
the Secretary of Agriculture; (2) delegation to the producers; and (3)
delegation to the cooperatives to vote on behalf of the producers.2 9 9
Again the statute, unlike in Schechter, was well constructed as a lawful
288. Id. at 9.
289. Id. at 15. If Congress can withhold its power on the condition of private-party
approval, then why could Congress not withhold its power upon using its own, monocameral approval requirement. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
290. See Currin, 306 U.S. at 15.
291. Id. at 15-16.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. See id.
295. United States v. Rock Royal Coop, Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 546 (1939).
296. Id. at 547.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 574.
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delegation to the Secretary."' The Court found the statute provided
all the elements of a lawful delegation because it allowed the Secretary to fix prices only for specific commodities, contingent on hearings
and findings.30 ' Additionally, the statute conferred a right to objection by the milk handlers to approve the order and, in turn, for producers to approve the order.30 2 "Even though procedural safeguards
cannot validate an unconstitutional delegation, they do furnish protection against arbitrary use of properly delegated authority."3 3 The
power of the producers to approve the order and the representative
voting by the cooperatives were considered merely procedural safeguards, because Congress had the power to affect the order without
approval by anyone.3 04
Hence, the delegations involved in both Currin and Rock Royal
were not delegations to private parties despite the provision for their
approval.305 It would seem, as a general rule, that where a statute
allows private parties to compel a government rule-making action
rather than merely provide a safeguard against the arbitrary exercise
of delegated power, the statute is unconstitutional.30 6 In essence, who
makes and enforces the decisions are of paramount importance.
The prohibition of delegation of the power to private parties can
include the person of the President, as well as private industry.30 7 But
where Congress has provided the policy, limits, and standards, the
President may be its agent.30 8 Without these limits, there would be no
system of checks and balances to prevent the natural encroachment by
one branch into the power of another. 30 9 The agent's power would
become unfettered and be able to be exercised without the external
control provided by the checks and balances of the other branches of
government. 310 These limits allow the modern administrative state to
function in a debatable constitutional manner. 3 11 Even if we were to
accept the constitutionality of delegation to a single branch administrative agency, any deviation from the limits would render an administrative agency unconstitutional.

300. Id. at 575.
301. Id. at 576.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 577.
305. Id.; Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1939).
306. See Currin, 306 U.S. at 15-16 (1939); Rock Royal, 307 U.S. at 576.
307. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
308. Id. at 537-42.
309. See id.
310. See id.
311. See BREYER, supra note 10, at 43-56.
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IV.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

The Executive reorganization that created the DHHS as a government department originated with just one client: the public.3 12 If the
Legislature had created the DHHS as a delegation to private interest
groups, the legislation would have fallen in face of the nondelegation
doctrine.3 13 Nonetheless, many key employees of the DHHS agencies
are on the payroll of various pharmaceutical companies which are private interest groups.3 1 4 Further, these private interests related to the
pharmaceutical industry have for some time unduly influenced the
government.31 5 The questions created by private interest involvement
in a public federal government agency are three-fold. First, may an
agency effectively privatize itself, even to a limited extent, when the
legislature provided for a public agency? Second, would this privatization withstand scrutiny under the separation of powers and
nondelegation doctrine? Third, what remedies are available once this
privatization has occurred?
This status change of agency employees from a purely public servant, concerned only about the public, to a partially privatized interest
by virtue of their financial conflicts of interest not only calls into question where their loyalties lie, but also the impartiality of the entire
organization. 316 Dr. Arnold S. Relman, Emeritus Editor-in-Chief of
the New England Journal of Medicine, warns that when agency employees are receiving sums of money from a company, they will desire
the company to perform well.31 7 The agency's "permissive culture" is
fraught with conflicts of interest.3 1 8 When this privatization is coupled
with the fact that 50% of the FDA's funding for drug regulation is the
drug companies themselves, and the undue influence of conflicted advisory committees, the issue of the agency's privatization becomes
paramount.3 1 9 These factors imply that the agency is substantially operating under the influence of private interests. The result is that the
status of an agency whose employees are paid by the parties they are
regulating may be regarded as private-in-fact, if not private-in-law.
Although necessity is a ground to support broad delegation of
subordinate rule making authority, it does not support delegation to
312. See generally Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1953, 3 C.F.R. 131 (Supp. 1953),
reprintedin 5 U.S.C.A. app. at 187 (West 1996); John P. Swann, History of the FDA,
http://www.fda.gov/oc/history/historyoffda/default.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2006) (discussing the origins and development of the FDA).
313. See generally Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936); Schechter,
295 U.S. at 537.
314. See NIH Ethics Hearing, supra note 5, at 489.
315. See MAJORITY STAFF REPORT ON VACCINE POLICY MAKING, supra note 9, at
35-36.
316. See Stealth Merger, supra note 2, at Al.
317. Id.
318. See The Nation, supra note 9, at Al.
319. FDA Hearings, supra note 138.
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private interest groups.32 0 The Supreme Court holdings on delegating
regulatory functions to private interest groups are clear that it ". . . is
unknown to our law and is utterly inconsistent with the constitutional
prerogatives and duties of Congress. ' 321 In this area, the distinction
often used to separate legislation from subordinate rule making functions fails.322 There exists a strict prohibition against delegation of
rule making functions to private interest groups, especially those
whose interest are adverse to the third parties they affect.3 23
Some argue that the collaboration between government regulators
and drug companies is necessary and provides positive benefits.32 4
One argument states that conflicts of interest must be allowed because
there is a shortage of good scientists and experts in some fields of
interest and, therefore, incentives are necessary to attract scientists to
government positions.3 25 From a common sense perspective, however, it is difficult to imagine that the NIH, one of the most prestigious
institutions in academia (that consistently pays some of the highest
wages in the federal government), would have a difficult time with
recruitment.3 2 6 Further, these conflicts of interest lead others to question the impartiality of the researchers and regulators.3 2 7 In addition,
the experts themselves in any function requiring evaluation may bring
with them strong bias which can be subtlety encouraged by financial
interests. 328 Evidence also suggests that these relationships impact life
and death decisions and, therefore, it seems natural that the highest
care must be exercised.3 2 9
Put in a different context, federal drug enforcement officers are not
allowed to be the paid consultants of a drug cartel.3 30 Similarly, it
would be absurd to allow judge's to be on the payroll of the defendants they were prosecuting. 331 Nonetheless, regulators are on the payroll of the regulated, which has deleterious implications. 332 However,
deleterious or beneficial implications do not replace constitutional validity, nor does goodwill suffice to legitimize unconstitutional delega320. See generally Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936); A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935).
321. Schechter, 295 U.S. at 537.
322. See generally id.
323. Carter,298 U.S. at 311. However, some scholars believe it can be made constitutionally compliant with additional safeguards. See Gilliam E. Metzger, Privatization
as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367 (2003).
324. NIH Ethics Hearing, supra note 5.
325. Id.
326. Id. (testimony of Elias A. Zerhouni).
327. Nov. 2004 Autism Hearings, supra note 133 (testimony of Lyn Redwood).

328. See

MAJORITY STAFF REPORT ON VACCINE POLICY MAKING,

supra note 9, at

37.
329. Vioxx Hearing,supra note 9.
330. 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2000) (regarding bribery of public officials and witnesses).

331. See

MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

Canon 3 (2004).

332. Vioxx Hearing, supra note 9.
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tion.3 33 Therefore, if the goodwill of the President is insufficient, the
honor system used by the DHHS should be insufficient to remove the
constitutional difficulties of privatization.3 34
Conflicts in the NIH appear more innocuous from the constitutionality standpoint, at least on the surface, because the agency's primary
function is the promotion of the science of health.3 3 5 In terms of
nondelegation theory, the scientific endeavor might arguably be considered a factual determination exercise, which is clearly permitted
under the auspices of the contingency theory of delegation.33 6 Although it is easy to imagine arguments where some aspect of the NIH
agency would fit into any one of the three governmental functions, to
the extent that the NIH performs non-executive functions, it suffers
by conflicting with the separation of powers doctrine. And delegation
to private interests is prohibited regardless of the governmental function.337 Additionally, the scientific opinions generated by the NIH are
used in regulatory functions,3 3 8 and when they are flawed by conflicts
of interest,33 9 the regulatory function may in turn be compromised.
The FDA, however, clearly performs a far more substantial regulatory function by regulating drug approval, drug use, and the behavior
of drug companies along with taking appropriate action against drugs
found to be harmful. 340 In these circumstances, conflicts of interest
can compromise the legislative rule-making function of promulgating
regulatory decisions, the judicial function of reviewing drug approval,
and the executive function of approving only safe drugs and taking
action against unsafe drugs. 34 1 All of these functions impact legislative control of third parties, either as competitor companies, or as private individuals whose protection is the primary purpose of the
agency. 342 The impact on the rights of third parties, especially in any
prohibitory regulation, implicates an unconstitutional delegation to
private parties.34 3
The past Supreme Court cases dealing with delegation issues all examined legislation that was either created with private interests in
333. See Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 420 (1935). "The point is not one of
motives but of constitutional authority, for which the best of motives is not a substitute." Id.
334. Id.
335. See U.S. GOV'T MANUAL, supra note 3, at 221-25.
336. See generally Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
337. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935).
338. See generally Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, Food & Drug Admin.,
Transcript of Arthritis Advisory Committee Meeting (July 30, 2002), http://
www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/O2/transcripts/3873T2_01.pdf (discussing dosages, toxicities, and safety data for Vioxx and other acute pain drugs).
339. See generally id.
340. See generally id.
341. See generally U.S. Gov'T MANUAL, supra note 3.
342. See generally id.
343. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936).
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mind or created with boundless authority.3 44 These cases did not consider legislation that was initially created within the confines of the
nondelegation doctrine only to be later converted by actions of the
public agency into an unlawful delegation of authority to private interests.3 45 Clearly, if the weight of the evidence indicates the agency is
no longer a public agent, then the nondelegation doctrine will have
346
been violated, and no amount of good-will or intention will save it.
But, can the actions of the pubic agent that create an unconstitutional
delegation be considered unconstitutional and therefore prohibited?
In this case, the NIH, FDA & CDC took actions that effected privatization. Arguably, in the NIHs case, they were authorized to do so
under the waiver clause in 18 U.S.C. § 208 .3 4 Because the waiver
clause permits the public agent to unfetter the limits provided by Congress, then the waiver clause is a boundless delegation.3 4 8 If the
waiver clause could convert a constitutional delegation into an unconstitutional delegation, then the clause itself would be unconstitutional
in effect. 34 9 This would not be the case if the waiver was to be granted
by a different branch department, because, then it would not be at the
public agent's own initiative to unfetter its limits.3 5 Albeit, even the
authority of Congress would have to answer to the restrictions of the
Constitution in allowing waivers that allow private interest involvement in the legislative process. 35' Finally, if the waiver process may
be simply ignored by the public agent who violates the bounds of authority provided by Congress, then any act thereof becomes an illegal
act. This points to the underlying weakness of the system. Once delegated to the Executive branch, the Congress has no real power to insure the public agent remains within the scope of the delegated
authority.

V. A FLAWED

SYSTEM

The system of administrative agencies is flawed. From the organization of the FDA drug enforcement division 3 52 to the general topology
344. See generally United States v. Rock Royal Coop, Inc., 307 U.S. 533 (1939);
Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 (1939); Carter 298 U.S. at 238 (1936); A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S.
388 (1935); Washington ex. rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928);
Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912).
345. See generally Rock Royal, 307 U.S. at 533; Currin, 306 U.S. at 1; Carter, 298
U.S. 238; Schechter, 295 U.S. at 495; Pan. Ref Co., 293 U.S. at 388; Roberge, 278 U.S.
at 116; Eubank, 226 U.S. 137.
346. See Carter 298 U.S. at 311.
347. 18 U.S.C. § 208 (2000).
348. See Schecter, 295 U.S. at 537-38.
349. See id.
350. See id.
351. See id.
352. See Vioxx Hearing,supra note 9.
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of the administrative state,353 there is a fundamental weakness-there
is no system of checks and balances that is fundamental to our constitutional government. The only real limit on agency action is selfrestraint.
Dr. David Graham, in testifying before the Senate Finance Committee, argued that the agency as currently constructed could not protect
the public. 354 He may be correct, especially in light of the conflicts of
interest in the latest safety advisory panel on COX-2 inhibitor
drugs. 355 The process of approving and regulating drugs has an inherent conflict of interest: when drugs present health issues, the same
regulators that originally approved the drugs must later take action
against the very drugs they approved.35 6 Not only are the parties that
approved the drug likely to have a strong bias having already convinced themselves of the drug's safety, they must also overcome having been wrong in the first place.357 The addition of a financial
incentive to promote the drug with an existing conviction that a drug
is safe creates a potentially lethal combination.3 5 8 In simpler terms,
the structure allows human frailties free reign: it mixes the vice of
pride with the vice of greed.
It is no small wonder that the DHHS is fraught with a permissive
culture of conflicts of interest, because there is a flaw built into the
very structure of the administrative agency.35 9 Looking from a larger
perspective, the delegation of administrative agencies within the Executive Branch poses a serious problem: when an administrative agency
breaks the law, the Executive Branch must execute the law against
itself. 360 In general, financial conflicts of interest are illegal under 18
U.S.C § 208,361 however, the section provides for waivers.362 In this
case of the NIH, the agency determined for itself that restriction on
conflicts could be relaxed to conform to the more relaxed executive
standards.3 6 3 The Executive branch, and more precisely, the agency
could determine for itself whether to enforce 18 U.S.C. § 208.364 The
NIH also interpreted federal law to allow employees to have greater
353. See generally BREYER, supra note 10, at 43-57.
354. Vioxx Hearing, supra note 9.
355. Press Release, Ctr. for Sci. in the Pub. Interest, supra note 60.
356. See Vioxx Hearing,supra note 9.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. See id.
360. See U.S. Gov'T MANUAL, supra note 3, at 492-93 (detailing the responsibilities of the Office of Government Ethics).
361. 18 U.S.C. § 208 (2000).
362. Id.
363. Stealth Merger, supra note 2, at Al (citing Varmus' 1995 memo).
364. See U.S. Gov'T MANUAL, supra note 3, at 492-93; 18 U.S.C. § 208 (2004). The
predecessor law to 18 U.S.C. § 208, 18 U.S.C. § 434, was reviewed by the Supreme
Court, which noted: "The statute is directed at an evil which endangers the very fabric
of a democratic society, for a democracy is effective only if the people have faith in
those who govern, and that faith is bound to be shattered when high officials and their
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confidentiality in the income they receive from outside sources.3 6 5 As
evidence of this compromised enforcement ability, the investigations
regarding conflicts of interest within the NIH did not begin until the
power of a free press provided the necessary impetus when David
his article detailing serious conflicts of interest
Willman published
3 66
within the NIH.
When the Executive Branch fails to enforce the laws against itself,
coupled with the power to interpret or create the law by subordinate
rule-making, the very fears of Montesquieu and Madison are fulfilled.3 67 "When the legislative and executive powers are united in the
same person or body ... there can be no liberty, because apprehensions may rise lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical
'
In this case, the faillaws to execute them in a tyrannical manner." 368
ure to execute the enacted law has the tyrannical impact on third parties-the victims of the dangerous drugs represented to be safe. This

is why Madison submitted in FEDERALIST No. 47 that "[t]his, however
is not among the vices of [this] constitution. The magistrate in whom
the whole executive power resides cannot of himself make a
law. ... "369 This is the very reason for the separation of powers doctrine and why the Constitution has three branches of government.
But there are larger structural problems with federal government
agencies. Under the separation of powers doctrine, modern administrative agencies have tenuous constitutionality.37 ° Administrative
agencies such as the FDA and CDC have been delegated the legislative functions in fact. 371 An excellent example of the legislation in fact
is elaborated by Michael Horwin discussing the development of federal vaccine policy. 37 2 According to Horwin, the FDA and CDC each
37 3
have a very influential committee in the development of that policy.
These recommendations are universally accepted and adopted as policy. 3 74 From these policies, rules are promulgated and State and Federal law is influenced with the aide of financial funds.37 5 One of the
cannons of nondelegation is that subordinate rule making does not
develop policy because policy development is a legislative function
appointees engage in activities which arouse suspicions of malfeasance and corruption." United States v. Miss. Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520, 562 (1961).
365. Stealth Merger, supra note 2, at Al.
366. The Nation, supra note 9, at Al; Stealth Merger, supra note 2, at Al.
367. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison), supra note 146, at 140.

368. Id. at 141.
369. Id. at 140
370. See BREYER, supra note 10, at 38-39.
371. See generally MAJORITY

STAFF REPORT ON VACCINE POLICY MAKING,

supra

note 9.
372. See Horwin, supra note 92, at 322 (discussing the key role played in creation of
vaccine policy).
373. Id. at 338.
374. Id. at 354.
375. Id.
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that cannot be delegated.3 7 6 These delegations have the effect of acthe whole of all three powers within the hands of one
cumulating
37 7
group.

Theoretically, Congress retains the power to enact a new law repealing offensive provisions of the prior delegations, but it suffers
from bicameral requirements, sufficient definiteness, and the original
compromised execution.3 78 First, the power has already accumulated
in the Executive Branch and Congressional legislation to affect that
power requires bicameral passage and presentment to the President,
therefore, requiring the approval of Executive Branch to relinquish
that power.3 79 Second, one of the reasons for delegating legislative
power is that laws enacted by Congress lack definiteness and, therefore, without an absolute plain text ban on conflicts of interest, the
Executive Branch can interpret the law to its benefit.3 ° Finally, even
if the law is clear in its text as to prohibit interpretation, the Executive
Branch may simply fail to enforce the law. Hence, the analysis returns
to the original problem: the Executive Branch continues to be inherently compromised in executing the statute against itself. Arguably, a
truly independent agency mandated to investigate and prosecute government corruption may be a viable partial solution.
Congress is likewise hampered in controlling the situation. Once
Congress has delegated power it cannot get it back and the result is
that power from multiple branches accumulates in one branch of the
government.3 8 1 In addition, the Supreme Court terminated the Legislative veto power. 38 ' The judiciary is unlikely to restore the balance,
because the Supreme Court has already held in favor of Skidmore and
Chevron deference as well as to the capitulation to the administrative
state on behalf of the legislature.3 8 3 Considering the limitation of bicameralism and presentment placed on the legislature,38 4 the defer38 5
ence required of courts to the administrative adjudicative decisions,
and the limitations on the President's ability to dismiss senior officials
of independent agencies and subordinate officials of executive agen376. See Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 415-21 (1935).
377. See id.
378. See CHOPER, supra note 154, at 155.
379. Id.
380. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-74 (1989).
381. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951-59 (1983).
382. Id. at 959.
383. See generally Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944); Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The Court in Chadha not only
limited the Legislatures' ability to control the administrative state, but also its own
ability by requiring deference to administrative decisions. Chadha, 462 U.S. at
951-59.
384. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 957-58.
385. Id. at 986.
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cies,38 6 the ultimate result is a truly independent administrative state
uncontrollable by any branch of government. In summary, the executive cannot fire them, the judiciary cannot overrule them, and the legislature cannot repeal them and these administrative agencies exercise
all three powers of the government. 387 Hence, the administrative
agencies have truly become a fourth branch of government. And now
considering the influence of private interests and that the FDA receives almost 50% of its funding for drug regulation from drug manufacturers,3 8 8 its independence even defies Congress's to control the
organization with budget constraints. Perhaps a better title would be
to call the federal agencies quasi-independent governments.
This problem is precisely what the separation of powers doctrine
was created to prevent: the accumulation of power in one branch.3 89
Current agencies represent powers of all three branches within one
branch, albeit with limited deferential judicial review and with limited
control by the legislature.39 All that power in one place is highly corruptible and difficult to control as clearly demonstrated by the failure
of the Vaccine Policy Making Report to prevent the conflicts of interest in the 2005 FDA safety advisory panel on COX-2 Inhibitors.3 9 '
The lack of manageability and controllability can lead to devastating
consequences, such as the damage created by bad medicines reaching
the market with approval that is based on insufficient or biased studies.39 2 The Vioxx unmitigated disaster is only a fragment of the potential damages if the allegations against Thimerosal and vaccines in
general turn out to be true.3 93

VI. A

PROPOSED SOLUTION

There are numerous discussions of nondelegation and solutions to
the never reconciled constitutionality of the administrative agencies
with the separation of powers doctrine.3 9" Similarly, a variety of solu386. See generally Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651 (1997); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
387. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L.

REV. 29, 60 (1986).
388. Vioxx Hearings,supra note 9.

389. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison).
390. See Sunstein, supra note 387, at 60.
391. MAJORITY STAFF REPORT ON VACCINE POLICY MAKING,

supra note 103;

Press Release, Ctr. for Sci. in the Pub. Interest, supra note 60.
392. Vioxx Hearing, supra note 9; Nov 2004 Autism Hearings, supra note 133.
393. 2002 Autism Hearings, supra note 120.
394. See Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327,
332-33 (2002) (advocating the position taken by Justice Thomas that there could be a
delegation with an "intelligible principle" of such significance to make it legislative);
Sunstein, supra note 234, at 334-35 (2000) (arguing that the nondelegation is alive and
well but has changed character to require that administrative agencies cannot make
decisions on their own and must consult Congress thereby minimizing ill affects);
Hamilton, supra note 232, at 809 (advocating revival of the nondelegation doctrine);
Brown, supra note 156, at 1516 (urging the Supreme Court to apply separation of
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tions have also been proposed to solve the problem of conflicts of

interest within the DHHS administrative agencies. 395 None have been

implemented. 39 6 Even if implemented, they are not likely to work for

the reason underlying Michael Horwin's statement: "[t]he CDC and
FDA are likely to reject every one of these ideas," that is, they have
accumulated too much power.3 97 This Comment proposes that the so-

lution lies in rigid application of the separation of powers doctrineall administrative agencies must be broken into their constituent legislative, executive and judicial functions and reassigned as separate organizations under the three corresponding branches of government.
The law need not be challenged in court to be changed, although
that is one potential option. The courts, however, are saddled with

precedent of their own making, from the "switch in time that saved

the nine"3'9 8 through continued support of delegations and deference
to the Executive Branch agencies. 399 However, the case may still be
argued on grounds of separation of powers. Instead of using the formalist versus functionalist approaches, 4" the issue can be raised based

on the net effect: the accumulation of power in the DHHS exists, contrary to the separation of powers doctrine, which has allowed corruption resulting devastating effects.
As a solution, Congress should legislate a redistribution of agency
functions to the appropriate branches of government. This would create at least three agencies to replace the original agency. The new
powers to the protection of individual rights); Theodore J. Lowi, Two Roads to Serfdom: Liberalism, Conservatism and Administrative Power, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 295, 322
(1986) (advocating the reduction of administrative discretion to restore the constitutionally mandated balance of power between the branches of government); Richard
B. Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine,36 AM. U. L. REV. 323, 328-29 (1987) (arguing for transference of decision making to local or private groups because less concerned with abuse than efficiency); David Schoenbrod, Goal Statutes or Rules Statutes:
The Case of the Clean Air Act, 30 UCLA L. REv. 740, 803-24 (1983) (advocating a
return to contingency theory delegation by arguing that Congress should engage in
rule statutes and not goal orient statutes in delegating to administrative agencies);
Ernest Gellhorn, Commentary, Returning to First Principles, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 345,
349 (1987) (arguing that "[m]odern government's constitutional breach has been its
failure to abide by the Constitution's requirement that the legislature make all laws"
and is being used to create private benefit). Gellhorn's solution is a limited and careful revival of the nondelegation doctrine by allowing a broader application. Id. at 353.
395. Horwin, supra note 92, at 350-62 (proposing the tightening of the laws against
conflicts of interests, implementing a more stringent code against conflicts of interests,
changing the composition of committees evaluating vaccine safety, utilizing oversight
councils, tax payor derivative suits, and qui tam litigation).
396. See, e.g., id. at 349-50 (Congressman Dan Burton's failed attempt to pass legislation); contra Memorandum from the Nat'l Inst. of Health on Policy Proposal for
Management of Conflict of Interest (Sept. 24, 2004), http://www.nih.gov/about/
092404coi-policymemo.htm (introducing a shift in NIH policy regarding conflicts of
interests).
397. Horwin, supra note 92, at 356.
398. See CHOPER, supra note 154, at 48.
399. See id. at 76-80.
400. See id. at 155.
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agencies would report to their functionally respective branch of government: the executive would remain with the executive, the judicial
would move underneath the federal court system, and the legislative
would move under legislative committees. Although the change
would be minor for the executive functions, the judiciary would then
gain control of the judicial process and remove appeals to the legislative-executive board. 4' The Legislature would gain the power to insure that the subordinate rules remain within the scope of the policy
they set forward. This arrangement would also provide for a system of
checks and balances between the three constituent organizations. Additionally, an independent agency could be formed to investigate and
prosecute government corruption relieving the executive branch of
the responsibility to investigate itself. This is not to say the task would
be easy as it would upend the current administrative state.
Fundamental to the creation of the administrative state is the justification of the necessity that allows the Legislature to delegate
subordinate rule-making powers." 2 This necessity is based on the
Legislature's inability to provide the necessary detailed consideration
to pass administrative rules. 0 3 The proponents of this view are undoubtedly correct. However, there exists a well equipped organization designed to provide exactly that capability-the current
administrative agencies. The problem is that the legislative machinery
contained in those administrative agencies is either reporting to the
Executive Branch or is formulated as independent agencies instead of
reporting to the Legislature. 0 " The solution proposed here is a simple
one: equip the legislative branch by moving the legislative functions of
agencies from the executive back to the legislative branch.
The legality of self delegation of legislative power is questionable,
especially in light of the Framers' concern that the Legislature was the
most dangerous branch. 0 5 In response, can it be seriously contended
that the legislative power is any less dangerous when merged with executive power? All arguments objecting to legislative self-delegation
fail against one simple principle: although controversial, it is at least as
valid under the legislative branch as it is under the Executive Branch
especially in light of the increased harmony with the separation of
powers. 40 6 Even if disputed, the critical aspect of this self-delegation
is by the Supreme Court's own admission, not law-making, rather
subordinate rule-making.40 7 Further, as long as the Supreme Court
continues to treat these processes as subordinate rule-making func401.
402.
403.
404.
405.

See generally Sunstein, supra note 387, at 60.
See Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 415-21 (1935).
See Id.
See U.S. Gov'T MANUAL, supra note 3, at 217-27.
See CHOPER, supra note 154, at 155.

406. See Seth Barrett Tillman, The Domain of ConstitutionalDelegations Under the
Orders, Resolutions, and Votes Clause, 83 TEX. L. REv. 1389, 1392 n.8 (2005).
407. See Pan. Ref Co., 293 U.S. at 421.
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tions, Congress is free to place the function wherever they deem fit,40 8
excepting subordination to private interest groups. 40 9 Bicameral passage and presentment is also not an issue, because the bicameral passage and presentment has been met when the law forming the agency
was passed, and further bicameral passage and presentment is not required to promulgate rules.4 ' Additionally, splitting the agencies
may present a form of presentment to the President or Presidential
delegate in the corresponding executive agency providing a new system of checks and balances more inline with the Framers' design of
the Constitution.41 1
Depending on the final structure, single House resolution 412 objections may offer some resistance which can be addressed. It is clear
that encroachment objections would no longer be a solid basis for denying single House resolutions in this formulation because the resolution would not be a final act; it would still require Executive
approval.4 13 Optionally, the Court (however unlikely) still has the option of holding that because the Constitution allows for single house
resolutions in some cases, 414 there might be other cases where it could
be applied. And again, the Supreme Court already held that bicameral requirements do not apply to rule-making functions.4 1 5 In general, the justifications that allow delegation of subordinate rulemaking hold equally true for delegations of functions within a branch
of the government when it does not offend the separation of powers
doctrine.
Opponents to the proposed solution could argue that the change
presents a real challenge in that the constituent parts might lose expertise.41 6 The importance of expertise has been recognized by the
Supreme Court in their Skidmore and Chevron deference holdings.4 17
However, the courts have maintained specialized expertise in other
areas. 41 8 For illustration, under the Vaccine Compensation Act, all
vaccine compensation cases are heard by special masters that specialize in vaccine compensation cases.4 19 Thus, it appears that a special
master, similar to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), can maintain
408. See Id.
409. See generally Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935).
410. See United States v. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361, 386 n.14 (1989).
411. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison), supra note 146;
BREYER, supra note 10, at 37.
412. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 948-51 (1983).
413. See id. at 919.
414. See id. at 955.
415. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 387 n.14.
416. See Allentown Mack Sales and Serv. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359 (1998).
417. See generally Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944); Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
418. See generally Vaccine Compensation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-1 to 34 (2000).
419. § 300aa-12.
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appropriate expertise sufficient to performing judicial functions in
highly technical areas.4 2 ° In addition, the detachment may provide
more objective evaluation of promulgated regulations.
Currently, rules are often promulgated by boards and when a claim
is brought, it is brought before an ALJ.4 2 1 The claim may be appealed
for review to the original board that promulgated both the rule and
the procedure for claims, which is not only circular but encompasses
all three functions of government within one organization.42 2 Only
then may the claim be appealed for review by a federal appellate
judge.4 23 Separating the legislative, executive, and judicial nature of
the boards is likely to encourage detachment and provide for checks
and balances.
There are significant advantages as well. Congress would benefit
from greater control and influence over the rule making process and
content.4 24 If nondelegation logic is to be taken seriously, then it cannot be disputed that a "core function" of Congress is to make policy.
By placing the part of the administrative agency that promulgates
rules and regulations inferior to Congress, Congress can then insure
that its broad policy is followed. Additionally, if a proposed rule required the establishing of policy such that it truly required the passage
of law, it could be sent up the new management chain to be submitted
as a bill for consideration by Congress. The single greatest gain is that
Congress would then have the resources and capability to address the
lack of definiteness in laws that propelled the creation of the administrative state in the first place.42 5
This solution, although revolutionary, does provide many positive
features: it re-instates a system of checks and balances; it provides organization better in line with the separation of powers principles; it
deters administrative acts not in line with delegated policy; and it provides Congress with the power and capability to deliver regulations.
This solution is just one of many possible solutions, but it is the surest
way to control the difficulties of the influence of private interests
within government.
VII.

CONCLUSION

On December 7, 2003, the L.A. TIMES ran a major story exposing
conflicts of interest in the NIH, a department of the DHHS.4 26 Afterwards, the House Government Reform Committee began a series of
hearings investigating the nature of the conflict only to discover hun420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.

Id.
See generally Sunstein, supra note 387.
See generally id.
See generally id.
See generally id.
See Pan. Ref Co., 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
Stealth Merger, supra note 2, at Al.
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dreds of relationships, at least a hundred of which were not reported.4 2 7 Due to the resulting public pressure, the director of the
NIH announced the need for drastic changes, severely limiting the
conflicts of interest.4 28
Considerable doubt existed when the NIH proposed a partial ban
on conflicts of interest. 42 9 Even the final promulgation of a total ban
is not sufficient.4 3 ° This action is not a permanent solution, because it
was promulgated by the executive department that it affects and it can
either be ignored by the executive department or repealed at their
political convenience as was effectively done in 1995.431 The NIH is
not the only department of the DHHS to have serious questions regarding these conflicts of interest; the FDA and CDC are likewise infected.4 3 2 But as it turns out, this action was not taken soon enough to
save the victims of Vioxx. It is estimated that 27,000 to 55,000 people
are now dead, and nearly 100,000 more may suffer serious
complications.4 3 3
Tragedies like this are preventable and the problem is not new to
Congress; they have heard similar and possibly even more condemning testimony, and have even made findings in a report the House
regarding incestuous conflicts of interest in U.S. vaccine policy-making five years earlier.4 34 Despite all this knowledge, Congress appears
435
powerless. The same criticisms leveled in the Majority Staff Report
4
3
6
And this time
can still be leveled at FDA safety advisory panels.
the actions of the safety panel were in the face of the catastrophic
damage done by Voixx. 43 7 Clearly, Congress does not have the power

to stop this behavior and needs greater direct control.
The conclusive solution is to break up the federal executive branch
agencies into their constituent legislative, executive, and judicial functions and to reassign them as separate organizations under the three
corresponding branches of government. The agency breakup solution
presents a massive undertaking. However, the budget of the NIH is
approximately $30 billion, which is smaller than the split of Hewlett
Packard, Inc. to form Agilent Technologies, Inc.,"43 and it is only one
legal system involved unlike addressing the multiple legal systems in427. NIH Ethics Hearing, supra note 5.
428. Id.

429. Id.
430. See generally 5 C.F.R. § 5501.106 (2004).
431. Stealth Merger, supra note 2, at Al (citing Varmus 1995 memo).
432. See Vioxx Hearing, supra note 9; Nov. 2004 Autism Hearings, supra note 133.
433. See Vioxx Hearing, supra note 9; Nov. 2004 Autism Hearings, supra note 133.

434. See MAJORITY STAFF REPORT ON VACCINE
Nov. 2004 Autism Hearings, supra note 133.
435.

POLICY MAKING,

MAJORITY STAFF REPORT ON VACCINE POLICY MAKING,

supra note 9;

supra note 9.

436. Press Release, Ctr. for Sci. in the Pub. Interest, supra note 60.
437. Vioxx Hearing, supra note 9.
438. Steven Lipin & Don Clark, H-P May Split Into at Least Two Entities, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 2, 1999, at A3.
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volved in splitting of a multinational corporation. Therefore, although
difficult, it is clearly possible.
Splitting up agencies into functional groups creates the necessary
independence of the branch functions and provides for more direct
control by the Congress. This would also bring the agencies more
fully in line with the Framers' intentions and the textual construction
of the Constitution, thereby, improving the constitutional standing of
agencies.439 The resulting executive agency would have more freedom to monitor and prosecute any illegal activity or unethical behavior; thereby installing a system of checks and balances, especially if an
independent agency for government investigations were created in the
process. In turn, it will minimize the problems of special interest influence and human frailty providing a safer environment for U.S.
citizens.
In the immortal words of James Madison, "[iln framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the
governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself."44 The creation of the administrative state endowed the great benefit by enabling the government to govern its citizens, but it is clearly time to
oblige the government to control itself.
Vale Krenik
439. See U.S. CONST. art. I-II1; THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47, 48 (Madison).
440. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison), supra note 146, at 160.
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